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The ability to communicate and transmit targeting data via the electromagnetic 
spectrum is crucial to the Navy’s ability to fight. However, in recent years, potential 
adversaries have significantly advanced their electronic warfare capabilities, obtaining an 
ability to interfere with the Navy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum during operations 
in contested environments.  
SEA23 investigates concepts of operation focusing on future potential 
electromagnetic-spectrum warfighting capabilities in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
Specifically, we explore these capabilities using modular unmanned and manned 
platforms capable of carrying communications and data suites to enable cross-domain 
targeting information in support of tactical offensive operations in a contested, denied, 
degraded, intermittent, and limited-bandwidth environment. This project focuses on 
developing a system-of-systems architecture and analyzing alternatives to provide 
potential solutions while developing the associated concepts of operation. We 
recommend an architecture based on Link 16 and organic rotary-wing unmanned aerial 
vehicles to transfer sensor to shooter data in demanding and contested environments.  
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The proliferation of land and sea-based platforms capable of projecting a highly 
sophisticated, effective and integrated anti-access, area-denial environment poses a 
significant problem for the U.S. Navy. In these environments, the current fleet methods 
for tactical offensive operations from the sea are frequently deemed high-risk (i.e., carrier 
strike groups) or incapable of projecting sufficient power (i.e., a small surface action 
group). The need for resilient strike capabilities in a high-risk combat environment, 
results in capability gaps that exist with current systems. The Systems Engineering 
Analysis Cohort 23 (SEA23) was tasked with developing a system of systems (SOS) to 
integrate cross-domain naval fires in these combat situations, with potential for fielding 
in the 2025–2030 period. 
Tasking from the project sponsor, OPNAV N9I (Deputy Director for Warfare 
Integration), was broad in scope. However, after conducting a stakeholder analysis, 
SEA23 decided to narrow the focus to the communication of fire control data between a 
forward sensing platform to a firing platform because of current capability gaps. The 
project team explored and analyzed multiple manned and unmanned systems and tactical 
data link networks that could be suitable in the requested time period, and pared down the 
original tasking statement as follows: 
SEA23 will investigate a concept of operations in a contested environment 
using modular unmanned and manned platforms capable of carrying 
communications and data suites to enable cross-domain targeting 
information in support of tactical offensive operations in a contested, 
denied, degraded, intermittent, and limited bandwidth environment 
(DDIL). 
SEA23 made critical assumptions to scope the project and enable completion in a 
nine-month period. The first major assumption is that the degradation of GPS will be 
graceful. In addition, alternate methods of precision navigation and determining time 
exist for weapons targeting. The second major assumption is the surface action group 
employed for assessing system alternatives consists of three Arleigh Burke class guided 
missile destroyers, allowing exploration into the concept of distributed lethality (Rowden 
 xxvi 
et al. 2015). Finally, we assume the system needs to rely on line-of-sight relay to 
overcome DDIL challenges. This situation is a good application for mesh networking due 
to their dynamic and ad hoc nature. In a changing environment, “the ability of self-
organization, self-discovering, self-healing, and self-configuration” (Misra et al. 2009) 
inherent in mesh networks is highly prized. These assumptions enabled the research 
efforts to focus on the network architecture, type and requisite supporting platforms. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were determined to be the best systems to 
structure a tactical targeting relay network in the DDIL environment to achieve long-
range line-of-sight capabilities. Near fully autonomous UAVs carry the proposed network 
hardware, which can operate collectively to support a mesh network. Figure 1 displays 
how the “Fire Web” communications network fits into a larger system providing 
offensive capability to Navy surface forces. A surface action group connects to remote 
sensing assets, either manned or unmanned, using the “Fire Web.” The sensing assets 
pass targeting quality data to the SAG that can engage the detected targets.  
 
Figure 1. OV-1 Operational View. 
 
Bounding the mesh network to line-of-sight communications establishes the 
system requirements for UAV separation, operational altitude, power requirements for 
transmission, payload capacity, and needed reliability, availability, and maintainability. 
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The extent of the network and subsequent required quantity of UAVs is dependent on the 
weapon range and uncertainty of the enemy’s location, which shape the total area 
required for the network to cover. SEA23 based weapon range on the open source data 
for the long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM), which is 500 nautical miles, and an 
uncertainty arch of 180 degrees. Using a semi-circle with 500 nautical mile radius along 
the threat axis provides the required coverage area for the UAV based mesh 
communication relay network. This creates a worst-case scenario for the SAG’s UAV 
carrying capacity and allows growth for the future of the system.  
The alternatives for transferring data used current U.S. Navy tactical data links, 
and potential tactical links that suited the network architecture and concept well. SEA23 
examined and analyzed Link-16, Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and other 
UAV based data links to determine their suitability within the stakeholder and derived 
requirements, with an eye on future weapons system development. The team verified the 
networks for acceptable transmission range using basic electromagnetic physics,  
which provided valuable insight to the quantity of UAVs required given the area to  
cover (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.  Tradeoffs for Selected Tactical Data Links. 
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SEA23 selected UAV alternatives considering their launch and recovery 
requirements, storage area aboard surface combatants, and the range and payload 
requirements of the network hardware. As a function of the launch and recover process, a 
rotary type UAV was determined to be best suited to the system. The hangar area aboard 
the ships for the UAVs was constrained by the cubic size of a collapsed MH-60 Seahawk 
helicopter. The payload, range, launch, and recovery requirements narrowed the search 
for UAVs to three existing platforms: MQ-8B Fire Scout, DP-5X Wasp, and DP-14 
Hawk. The three UAVs provide known rotary wing capabilities suitable for this analysis. 
The analysis results of the potential tactical data link networks and UAV 
platforms, constrained by physical environment, payload weight, ranges, and 
transportation yielded three conclusions 
1. The Link-16 data link is the only viable alternative of those data links 
studied due to its long range and lighter weight.   
2. The preferred solution, using a Link-16 data link and DP-5X Wasp UAVs, 
and retaining the three-ship SAG may require sacrificing MH-60 
helicopters to ensure sufficient UAV hanger space. Due to limitations with 
data rates, using Link 16 constrains the SAG’s anti-air warfare (AAW) 
capability that also relies on this link for data transfer. The loss of MH-60s 
decreases the ship’s ability to conduct search and rescue, anti-submarine 
warfare, and personnel transportation, including medical evacuations. 
3. Adding a littoral combat ship (LCS) to the SAG is an additional 
alternative to increase UAV capacity or retain manned helicopter 
capability. 
A rotary UAV capable of supporting a Link-16 data link system is considered 
feasible to develop, and will provide a seamless integration with sea-based integrated fire 
control. The DP-5X rotary UAV supports the payload requirement for the Link-16 data 
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The United States Navy (USN) is currently researching the ability to conduct 
operations in an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2AD) environment where potential enemies 
can hold surface ships at risk. Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 23 project team had 
tasking to design a system of systems (SOS) network incorporating the integration of 
cross-domain targeting information in a 2025–2030 time frame employed in a contested 
area where use of the electromagnetic spectrum is constrained by potential adversary 
actions. SEA23 used the South China Sea as a foundational scenario to assess network 
alternatives, based on the increasing tensions and widespread operational complications 
of the A2AD environment. 
Distributed lethality (DL) is a developing concept within the surface warfare 
community. It defines the ability for small groups of surface forces to provide 
overwhelming amounts of offensive firepower against an adversary. Furthermore, it 
involves a purely distributed and integrated force capable of providing organic levels of 
command and control (C2), offensive firepower, and power projection (Rowden et al. 
2015). Distributed lethality provides a framework and focus in development of a Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) to support offensive surface warfare forces. A major 
component of this project uses a surface action group (SAG) of three destroyers, with an 
understanding of capabilities and limitations, to seek a network, integrated solution to 
provide reliable targeting information in a contested environment. 
A. PROJECT TEAM 
Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 23 (SEA23) is comprised of students from 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the National University of Singapore’s 
Temasek Defence Systems Institute (TDSI), with each student bringing a unique set of 
experiences and knowledge to bear on the project’s tasking. Four surface warfare 
officers, two naval aviators, a submariner, a human resources officer, and two Army 
acquisitions officers represent the U.S. members of the team. Additionally, the team’s 
TDSI students include an Israeli infantry officer as well as members of Singapore’s 
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Army, Navy, and civilian defense industry (Table 1). Altogether, SEA23 has 
considerable real world experience to bring to bear upon the project tasking. SEA23’s 
TDSI student members study many academic subject areas in addition to their operational 
experiences. The team members are studying operations research and analysis, computer 
science, mechanical and electrical engineering, oceanography, and physics. 
Table 1.   SEA23 Project Team Composition. 
SEA23 Capstone Project Advisor 
 
Dr. Fotis Papoulias (NPS Associate Professor, Systems Engineering) 
 
SEA23 Subject-Matter Experts 
 
CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey Kline (NPS Professor of Practice, Operations Research) 
CAPT Chuck Good (COMNAVSURFPAC detachment Monterey) 
CDR (Ret.) Matthew Boensel (NPS Associate Professor, Systems Engineering) 
 
SEA23 Capstone SEA Students 
 
LT J.R. Cox (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT David Erstad (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT John Fisher (Aviation, F/A-18C/D Hornet Pilot) 
Cpt. David Hanna (Army Acquisitions) 
LT Zach Martens (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT Tim Reeves (Surface Warfare Officer) 
Cpt. Brandon Wagner (Army Acquisitions) 
 
SEA23 TDSI Students 
 
LT Sophia Bay (Human Resources Officer) 
Cpt. Roey Ben Yoash (Israeli Army, Infantry) 
Cpt. Chun Chieh Cheng (Singapore Army, CBRE/CBRN) 
MAJ Guoquan Lai (Singapore Army, Signals) 
Jin Wei Lai 
Kum Leong Lee 
Eng Soon Lim (Singapore Army, Armor) 
Wee Yeow Lim (Singapore Army, Artillery) 
Jianwen Lin (Singapore Army, Signals) 
LT Nelson Mitchell (Submariner) 
Chee Kiong Ong 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Weihao Kevin Soon (Singapore Army, Vehicle, Maintenance) 
MAJ Chew Kung Tan (Singapore Navy, Electronic Warfare) 
Cpt. Kenny Sheng Yong Teo (Singapore Army, Artillery) 
CDR Kevin Williams (Aviation, P-3 Naval Flight Officer) 
Cpt. Chee Mun Kelvin Wong (Singapore Army, Air Defense Acquisitions) 
Luhai Wong 
Kam Wah Wu 
Siew Peng Yue 
Zhibin Zhang (Singapore Army, Artillery/IT) 
 
 
B. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The SEA curriculum combines a variety of systems engineering, combat systems, 
and operational analysis courses culminating in the application of a systems analysis 
approach to the project. As defined by NPS, 
Systems Analysis provides key insights for improved operation of existing 
complex defense systems; it examines existing systems to better 
understand them. This understanding is then used to determine and choose 
among alternatives for system design, improvement and employment. 
Systems analysts apply modeling, optimization, simulation, and decision 
making under risk and uncertainty. (NPS 2015) 
Ultimately, this program provides the USN and DOD with military professionals 
who are able to apply SE, operational analysis, and systems analysis to a wide range of 
complex problems. The curriculum structured provides a sound academic foundation in 
systems engineering and analysis for the first half of the two-year program. The second 
half continues to develop these academic skills by focusing on the practical application of 
completing a detailed and integrated capstone project.  
SEA23 students first began considering their project during the Warfare 
Innovation Workshop during Enrichment Week, September 2015. This four-day forum 
brought together students and faculty, defense industry, and DOD employees at NPS. 
This unique innovative environment allows the free exchange of ideas and provides both 
the operational and research and development worlds to better understand each other’s 
capabilities. The September 2015 theme was “Creating Asymmetric Warfighting 
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Advantages: Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare,” which was a jump-start to SEA23’s 
project. The workshop had a stated mission of “advancing the [Chief of Naval 
Operations]’s concept of Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) and leveraging 
unmanned systems to enhance cross domain operations” (CRUSER 2015). It exposed 
SEA23 team members to various challenging operating environments for naval forces 
and alternative technologies to assist meeting those challenges. The SEA project and the 
Warfare Innovation Workshop were sub-sets of the larger Naval Postgraduate School 
Warfare Innovation Continuum titled “Creating Asymmetric Warfighting Advantages” 
(Figure 1). 
 
SEA23 Final Production Review (FPR) briefing slide 
Figure 1.  NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum. 
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The Consortium for Robotics, Unmanned Systems, Education and Research 
(CRUSER) is comprised of students, academics, and government and industry 
professionals with a focus on unmanned and robotic systems as directed by the Secretary 
of the Navy (SECNAV). CRUSER focuses specifically on four goals (CRUSER 2015): 
1. provide a source for unmanned systems employment concepts for 
operations and technical research 
2. provide an experimentation program to evaluate unmanned system 
employment concepts 
3. provide a venue for Navy-wide education in unmanned systems 
4. provide a DOD-wide forum for collaborative education, research, and 
experimentation in unmanned systems 
CRUSER sponsors and hosts the Warfare Innovation Workshop. For three to four 
days, it combines elements of design, divergent, and convergent thinking practices for 
innovative solutions. CRUSER Warfare Innovation Workshop’s structure has three 
segments. 
1. New technology briefs 
2. Small group problem solving development 
3. Final brief presentations 
The first portion of the working group provides students with an overview into 
various innovative technologies from both within and outside the government. The 
second portion divides the participants into numerous small groups that are a mix of 
personnel from government and industry. Small group tasking was to provide 
recommendations on developing technological solutions to an overall problem that DOD 
may encounter in the future. The final portion requires a formal brief from each group 
detailing their various conclusions developed during the individual team sessions. The 
numerous solutions and feedback generated during these formal presentations represent a 
wide range of ideas and possible topics for future research. Results proposed during the 
workshop ranged from simple mechanical systems to the use of quantum entanglement. 
This workshop provided SEA23 with a basic understanding of new technologies, 
networking opportunities with future stakeholders and interested parties, and the ability to 
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begin thinking abstractly about the capstone project. The workshop proved to be 
extremely helpful in examining possible avenues of research and solutions for our 
project. 
The SEA23 capstone project officially began during the fall 2016 academic 
quarter (September–December 2015). Official project tasking and research exploration 
topics came through various DOD sources. OPNAV N9I Warfare Integration Division 
delivered SEA23’s problem statement. SEA23 had three academic quarters to 
conceptualize, design, and implement a solution. The final deliverable is a written report 
and three phases of formal presentation. SEA23 delivers the presentations to NPS 
students and faculty, stakeholders, and other interested parties. The project problem 
statement required the group to design a SOS network fully incorporating the joint 
integration of cross-domain targeting information in a 2025–2030 contested area. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND TASKING EVOLUTION 
The tasking statement required expertise in systems engineering, systems 
analysis, network optimization, and naval operations. SEA23 organized into subject 
matter teams to conduct research on the project’s different themes. The topics that were 
covered included systems engineering methods, communications networks, and current 
unmanned vehicle technology. SEA23’s project builds on the work completed by the 
previous cohort, SEA21A whose project involved surface-to-surface engagements and 
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. SEA21A defined their project 
tasking as: 
Design a maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and 
targeting system of systems (SOS) and concept of operations capable of 
detecting, classifying, and engaging targets in support of [over-the-
horizon] tactical offensive operations in a contested littoral area in the 
2025–2030 timeframe. (SEA21A 2014) 
Their project focused on the ability of organic Navy assets to launch UAVs to conduct 
targeting in an A2AD environment, reaching the conclusion that: 
The U.S. Navy shall develop an integrated network-centric surface-based 
UAV system capable of airspeeds in excess of 110 [knots] and sensor 
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ranges of greater than 130 NM to enhance surface fleet organic OTH first-
strike capabilities within A2/AD environments by 2025. (SEA21A 2014) 
SEA23 built on this thesis with a concentration on network relays in the denied, 
degraded, intermittent, and limited bandwidth (DDIL) environment. SEA23 conducted 
the research and analysis regarding the capability of the network to pass targeting data 
from the point of collection to the Command and Control (C2) node. 
Mesh networks were not a familiar subject area and required the assistance of 
subject matter experts to introduce them. Naval Postgraduate School Professor and Chair 
of Information Sciences Department Dr. Dan Boger recently published “Agile EMCON” 
which focuses on frequency use affecting the C2 environment. Dr. Boger’s paper and 
CRUSER presentation, as well as SEA23’s personal interactions with him, provided a 
better understanding of how to leverage the electro-magnetic spectrum in a DDIL, A2AD 
environment for effective C2. The papers “Mesh Networks in Littoral Operations” 
(Benson et al. 2015) and the “Guide to Wireless Mesh Networks” (Misra et al. 2009) 
gave insight into both the fundamental operational uses and the technical aspects of mesh 
networks. 
The CRUSER workshop provided an in-depth review into new technology 
development within and outside of the government. Briefing subjects included Additive 
Manufacturing by Kevin Reynolds of NASA Ames Research Center, Electronic 
Maneuver Warfare (EMW) by CDR Mark Coffman of Naval Warfare Development 
Center (NWDC) and U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), DARPA Collaborative 
Operations in a Denied Environment (CODE) by Mr. John Cranney of Deep Space 
Instrumentation Facility (DSIF) Lab, among others. These briefs gave SEA23 a broader 
knowledge of available technologies and the implementation of these technologies into 
future operations. In addition, working in small groups on a project at the workshop 
afforded the students the ability to network with personnel from DOD labs, academia, 
and industry. 
SEA23 become familiar with emerging naval tactics and doctrines. Three reports 
that were useful in developing a deeper understanding this were “The Cooperative 
Engagement Capability” from Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, “Maritime 
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Operations in Disconnected, Intermittent, and Low-Bandwidth Environment” from the 
18th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (Lapic et 
al. 2013), and “A Tactical Doctrine for Distributed Lethality” by CAPT (Ret.) Jeffrey 
Kline from NPS. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
Systems engineering and systems analysis are two critical domains necessary for 
this capstone project. First application of systems engineering principles was necessary in 
order to create a SOS. Next, application of systems analysis allowed for quantitative 
assessment into the overall design of the SOS. During the first quarter of the project 
development process, it was crucial for the group to decide which systems engineering 
process will best support the project. In Blanchard and Fabrycky’s Systems Engineering 
and Analysis outlines three primary models for guiding and understanding the systems 
engineering process.  
The first model is the waterfall process model (Figure 2). The waterfall method 
moves from start to finish and receives feedback once the entire cycle is complete. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky identify one of the major flaws with using this model “when 
deficiencies are found, phases must be repeated until the product is correct” (Blanchard 
and Fabrycky 2011, 36). Issues will always arise when using the systems engineering 
process in the real world. The group considered this model unacceptable for the project 
because the model is too rigid and provides no flexibility. SEA23 understood that the 
appropriate model necessary for the project required flexibility and feedback throughout 
the entire project process. 
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Figure 2.  Waterfall Process Model. Adapted from Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2011). 
The second model was the spiral process model (Figure 2). The spiral model has 
built in feedback and is a more detailed than the waterfall process. According to 
Blanchard and Fabrycky, “the spiral process model allows for an evaluation of risk before 
proceeding to a subsequent phase” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 37). The spiral 
process model is useful when the requirements are, or the program is, relatively new. 
With proper management, the model receives constant feedback through each step of the 
process. The major downside with using the spiral method is that it is very time 
consuming. From one perspective, the spiral method will be appropriate for the project 
due to the broad scope and ill-defined requirements; however, the project timeline (three 




Figure 3.  The Spiral Development Method. Source: Boehm (2000). 
The third model examined was the “Vee” process model (Figure 3). It is a step 
process, like the waterfall model, but with built in feedback loops throughout the entire 
process. The “Vee” model splits into two parts: “Decomposition and Definition 
Sequence, Integration and Verification Sequence” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 37). It 
is also less time intensive than the spiral process model. The group determined that using 
a DOD approved model that also had built in feedback was be the most useful model for 




Figure 4.  Systems Engineering Vee Model. Source Forsberg and Mooz (1992). 
The “Vee” process model has seven distinct parts: 
1. Stakeholder/Requirements Definition 
2. Requirements Analysis Process 





Stakeholder/Requirements Definition is the first step to refining the problem to a 
manageable size. The initial problem statement received from the project sponsor was 
broad and required discernment to identify the problem. The team conducted numerous 
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interviews with stakeholders and explored research avenues to analyze the initial problem 
statement and develop a more refined problem statement. Requirements analysis process 
consists of taking research and guidance from the stakeholders to decide which 
requirements the systems’ need. Once determined, this information determines how to 
both qualitatively and quantitatively assess those requirements. Architecture Design 
Process involves developing functional decomposition, functional flow block diagrams, 
and using operational and system views from the selected architectural framework. 
Implementation is the development of the system, whether through designing or 
developing a concept of the operation (CONOPS). Integration is the process of bringing 
together the different aspects of the system into one coherent framework. Verification is 
using tools to see whether the system is functional or not. Tools used for verification 
include modeling and simulation, optimization, wargaming, and testing measures of 
performance (MOP) or measures of effectiveness (MOE). Validation ensures that the 
system meets requirements. Throughout this entire process, feedback loops provide 
continual checks to help ensure the meeting of requirements with the appropriate focus. 
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Figure 5.  Systems Engineering V Model from SEA23 Final Progress Review 
Brief. 
When examining the “Vee” process model, SEA23 identified that the majority of 
the project work will be on the left side of the “Vee” rather than on the right side (Figure 
5) based on the rationale that the group was developing the SOS from scratch. Ultimately, 
the SOS will be theoretical with implementation of an analysis of alternatives using 
existing physical systems. The overall goal of this project was not to develop an actual 
physical prototype, but to create the framework that used to initiate a request for 
proposals (RFP) for operational use. As a result, much of the right side of the “Vee” will 
not necessarily remain relevant or appropriate to the overall project. With this 
understanding, the scope of the project will proceed from Stakeholder/Requirements 
Definition directly to Implementation. To utilize both sides of the “Vee,” SEA23 shifted 
functions to verification and validation (normally completed during the implementation 
or prototype development phase). Figure 6 shows this shift. 
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Figure 6.  SEA23 Modification to the V Model from FPR. 
After deciding on the “Vee” process model, SEA23 needed to pick an 
architectural framework. Maier and Rechtin’s The Art of Systems Architecting (2009) 
identifies four standard architectural frameworks, defined as 
the U.S. Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF), the 
Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF), the International 
Standards Organization’s RM-ODP standard, and the ANSI/IEEE 1471 
Recommended Practice for Architectural Description for Software-
Intensive Systems (now ISO 42010). All four use the basic concepts given 
above, but take different approaches to the selection of views, the models 
specified, and the overall approach to formalization and rigor. (315–316) 
SEA23 decided on the DODAF approach for architecture development. First, 
because this is a DOD sponsored project, DODAF is an approved DOD process model. 
Second, SEA23 used DODAF throughout the Systems Architecting academic course 
providing a basic familiarity. SEA23 understood the operational and system views in 
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DODAF, how they related to each other, and their importance to understanding complex 
architecture development. Third, the software program used throughout the SEA 
curriculum, CORESIM, uses the DODAF architectural framework (Vitech 2016). These 
reasons led SEA23 to the conclusion that the DODAF framework was the best option for 
developing the systems architecture.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
Upon commencing the project, the team recognized that certain items would be 
required as a final report, to include requirements analysis, stakeholder analysis, and 
functional analysis. These items were determined through several means. First, SEA23 
examined the “Vee” process model in greater depth. This helped the SEA23 to determine 
the general areas where it was necessary to develop products and the overall flow to 
developing those products through the process model. SEA23 used information from 
previous courses to determine the problem scope and the necessary analytical tools. This 
helped determine the flow and organization of the written report. The final written report 
mirrors the interim and final progress reports conducted for NPS students, faculty, and 
stakeholders. Finally, report generation came through an understanding of expectations, 
lessons learned, and feedback from previous cohorts of SEA final reports. The first three 
chapters of this report align with the first and second parts of the systems engineering 
“Vee” process model. Chapter I, “Introduction,” lays out the beginning stages of the 
overall process identifying the project team members, project background, literature 
review, and the SE process that was used. All of this general information explains the 
background variables and reasoning behind SEA23’s initial decisions. Chapter II “Need 
Analysis” is the first part of the “Vee” process model (Stakeholder and Requirements 
Definition). This section explains how stakeholders were determined and outlines the 
guidance they provided. Chapter III “Scope” examines our problem statement in depth 
and defines the boundaries of our problem statement. This is involved in parts one and 
two (Requirements Analysis Process) of the “Vee” process model. 
The next three chapters (IV, V, and VI) cover the core products generated by the 
project. Chapter IV “Functional Analysis” contains functional decompositions, functional 
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flow block diagrams, and architectural designs. This covers portions of part two and part 
three (Architectural Design Process) of the process model. Chapter V, “Concept of 
Operations and Preliminary Design,” consists of CONOP development, scenario 
specifics, and development of MOEs and MOPs. In the “Vee” process model, this covers 
portions of part three, four (Implementation), four (Integration) and five (Verification). 
Chapter VI “Modeling and Simulation” explains the models that were developed, the 
software, and the data produced. This covers chapters four, five, and six of the process 
model. The final three chapters (VII, VIII, and IX) are analysis. Chapter VII “Analysis of 
Alternatives” uses the data output from the models produced to examine a tradeoff of 
characteristics between several unmanned platforms. Chapter VIII “Cost Estimation” 
examines a cost relationship between the unmanned platforms in Chapter VII. Chapter IX 
“Conclusion” explains the completed project results. Chapter VII, VIII, and IX all cover 
portions of parts five and six (Validation) of the “Vee” process model. 
F. REPORT CONTRIBUTIONS 
Distributed lethality is a developing and evolving concept within the surface 
warfare community. It allows a group of surface ships to operate in a contested 
environment with significant offensive lethality. The research and analysis conducted 
throughout this project provide significant enhancements and advantages to surface 
forces. Using unmanned platforms that are organic to the surface components allows for a 
distributed force to remain undetected and in a position to provide offensive capabilities, 
while reducing their overall EM signature and locations. 
The Detect-to-Engage (DTE) sequence essentially requires three distinct parts. It 
requires a forward line of sensing (detection) platforms, a means to relay that information 
(to), and platforms capable of conduct offensive firepower engagements (engage). This 
project seeks to identify the “to” portion in the DTE sequence. SEA23 assumed that the 
detection and engagement pieces in the DTE sequence are accounted for (such as 
DARPA project injects, Surface Action Group (SAG) components) and as a result, this 
project’s tasking centers on how to relay effectively information throughout a network of 
node unmanned platforms. This information relay constrains U.S. forces and is a gap in 
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capability. To remain undetected or unlocated, U.S. naval forces will need to constrain 
their use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This project seeks to provide a means for 
surface forces to conduct offensive operations while making it difficult for a potential 
adversary to locate them. While maintaining a forward line of sensor platforms, surface 
forces are able to integrate and operate with those sensor platforms using a SOS node 
information relay network. SEA23 called it the “fire web” or “kill web” concept as the 
SOS node network (unmanned platforms) is capable of exchanging and relaying the 
appropriate targeting information necessary for surface platforms to conduct offensive 
strike capability. 
There are numerous avenues for additional information and additional manners in 
which this project can support forward deployed joint forces. Following the systems 
engineering process throughout this project, a significant scoping of the project was 
required to ensure solution generation, while meeting the strict time constraints. Chapter 
IX, “Recommended Future Analysis” identifies potential areas of further study and 
insight. 
 18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 19 
II. NEEDS ANALYSIS  
A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
One of the fundamental requirements for any systems engineering process is the 
identification and analysis of stakeholders. As a project gains complexity, particularly the 
associated system and the system of system components, the identification of 
stakeholders and the input from stakeholders becomes increasingly important to scope the 
problem. Stakeholders are personnel that have direct buy-in to the completion of a 
program. Scoping continues through the inputs received from stakeholders identifying the 
needs and requirements of the project. The architects of the system must ensure that the 
program meets the primary stakeholders’ needs and addresses the concerns of secondary 
stakeholders. According to the “Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of 
Knowledge,”  
Stakeholder needs and requirements represent the views of those at the 
business or enterprise operations level—that is, of users, acquirers, 
customers, and other stakeholders as they relate to the problem (or 
opportunity), as a set of requirements for a solution that can provide the 
services needed by the stakeholders in a defined environment. Stakeholder 
requirements play major roles in systems engineering, as they:  
• form the basis of system requirements activities. 
• form the basis of system validation and stakeholder acceptance. 
• act as a reference for integration and verification activities. 
• serve as means of communication between the technical staff, 
management, finance department, and the stakeholder community. 
(SEBoK 2016) 
Before stakeholder outreach and interviews, SEA23 generated a questionnaire for 
use when working with and interacting with potential stakeholder personnel. The 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the SEA Department Chair approved the list of 
questions (Appendix B). There were many stipulations on the specific types of questions 
that can be asked and the SEA group worked to ensure that the wording and direct 
questions were within the established parameters of the IRB to ensure the project focused 
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on system development and not human subjects research. Once approved, these questions 
formed a baseline for conducting research with potential stakeholders in seeking 
solutions for the prescribed problem statement. Each question listed in the IRB 
questionnaire was derived through a breakdown and understanding of the initial problem 
tasking statement. 
B. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
After receiving the problem tasking, SEA23 began to develop a list of 
stakeholders who will be influential on the project. This included numerous campus 
advisors, military personnel, and academic personnel who were located on the NPS 
campus (Table 2). They helped provide initial feedback and guidance for identifying 
further stakeholders and scoping of the project. 
Table 2.   NPS Stakeholders. 
Name Specialty  
RADM Rick Williams, USN (Ret.) NPS Chair of Expeditionary and Mine Warfare 
CAPT Jeffrey Kline, USN (Ret.) Operations Research Department 
CAPT Charles Good NPS Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Chair 
Dr. Fotis A. Papoulias Systems Engineering Department 
Dr. Michael Atkinson Operations Research Department 
CAPT Jeffrey Hyink, USN Senior NPS Aviator 
Dr. Dan Boger  Chair of Information Sciences Department 
 
SEA23 then began additional outreach to potential stakeholders across the DOD. 
NPS stakeholders identified these persons and entities as potential resources for research 
and insight into the project. SEA23 split this group into either primary or secondary 
stakeholders. Organizations that directly influenced the initial problem statement were 
primary stakeholders, while secondary stakeholders came through the contacts received 
through interviews and feedback with NPS personnel. The original list of stakeholders 
that was developed included the personnel and organizations listed in Table 3 and Table 
4. 
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Table 3.   Primary Stakeholders (outside of NPS). 
Name / Organization Location  
Sponsor:  OPNAV N9I (Mr. Mike Novak) Washington, DC  
COMPACFLT N9 (Mr. David Yoshihara) Pearl Harbor, HI 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (Distributed 
Lethality) 
Monterey, CA / San Diego, CA 
OPNAV N99  Washington, DC 
 
Table 4.   Secondary Stakeholders (outside of NPS). 
Name / Organization Location  
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Washington, DC / San Diego, CA 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Patuxent River, MD / San Diego, CA 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR) San Diego, CA 
Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air 
(NIFC-CA) (PEO / IWS) Washington, DC / Dahlgren, VA 
Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development 
Center (NSMWDC) San Diego, CA  
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab 
(JHUAPL) Baltimore, MD  
Naval Air Warfare Development Center 
(NAWDC) Fallon, NV 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC)  Keyport, WA 
Naval Submarine Development Squadron 
(SUBDEVRON) Five Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicles  Silverdale, WA 
 
 
Using the listed stakeholders, SEA23 identified specific personnel within those 
respective organizations with whom engagement regarding possible involvement, 
research, and insight will be valuable. Their feedback allowed SEA23 to determine how 
stakeholders might be able to support the project. To establish initial contact, Table 5 lists 




Table 5.   Initial Correspondence (email) List. 
Name Organization 
LCDR Dwan NSMWDC, N5 (IAMD) 
LT Josh Mills NSMWDC, N5, AO 
Mr. Burkholder  PEO IWS 7 
Mr. Kreischer PEO IWS 3 
Mr. Rogers COTF 
Mr. Sokol  JHU APL 
Mr. Johnathan Pino JHU APL 
LT TJ Stow Fleet Forces Command (FFC) 
LCDR Gahl OPNAV N96 
LCDR Taft Lead IAM WTI, Dahlgren 
LCDR Lewis COMPACFLT NPS POC  
LCDR Litchfield NSMWDC Dahlgren 
LT Boyle NAWDC, N6 (E-2D) 
Dr. Mary Ann Cummings NSWC Dahlgren / NAVSEA / Orchestrated 
Simulation through Modeling (OSM) / NIFC-CA 
 
 
The email provided a brief background and introduction to the SEA23 project and 
requested any additional information, research, and insight they might be able to provide. 
The SEA23 team wanted as much subject-matter-expertise as possible. The team 
provided two attachments with this email: a project summary with an OV-1 Operational 
View and the list of questions developed for IRB review. The email format ensured that 
the group stakeholder outreach remained consistent throughout the project. 
We write to establish contact for possible guidance in the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering/Analysis (SEA23) 
capstone project. As a cohort of students, we have been trained and 
educated in the SEA pipeline throughout our time at NPS and the final 
project serves as our research thesis.  
Our project’s purpose is to explore a system-of-systems capable of 
allowing cross-domain operations in a contested area. The project focuses 
on supporting tactical offensive operations across domains (air/surface/
undersea/cyber) using unmanned/manned systems. Attached to this email 
is the project tasking information. 
We are looking for potential support in the realm of stakeholder research, 
insight, and support. Our tasking includes applying a systems engineering 
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approach to generate a system-of-systems architectural design to support 
joint U.S. forces in a highly contested environment. An initial scenario for 
tackling this project focuses directly on the A2AD environment used to 
deny U.S. forces access into a very broad and diverse area.  
Any insight you might have to support our capstone project would be 
greatly appreciated. If there is an alternative point of contact you can 
suggest, we would appreciate your recommendation. Thank you very 
much for your consideration. 
 
C. STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK 
Stakeholder feedback was numerous throughout the project. SEA23 received it in 
two periods of outreach: the first in November 2015 and the second outreach in January 
2016. Feedback varied leading to the addition and removal of potential stakeholders. The 
feedback helped to scope the list of stakeholders and provided SEA23 with specific 
points for research. Many responded with alternate points of contact helping to identify 
specific SMEs who can provide support. Responses from the initial outreach are in Table 
6 with the second set of responses in Table 7. 
Table 6.   Initial Outreach Responses (November 2015). 
Name Organization / Feedback  
LCDR Dwan (NSMWDC) Feedback on the applicability of this project to 
future warfighting and integration.   
LT Josh Mills (NSMWDC) Feedback on numerous areas for research and 
other stakeholders that can support our research.   
Dr. Looney (USFF N802) Feedback on NIFC-CA and possible relation to 
our project, particularly integrated fire control 
relay.   
LT Steve Perry (NSMWDC) Feedback on numerous areas for research and 
other stakeholders that support. 
Mr. CJ Toombs (NAVAIR 
China Lake) 
Heimdall overview and SE approach to 
unmanned systems integration for sensors, C2, 
and communications 
LCDR Gahl (OPNAV N96) Primary point of contact (POC) for items related 
to stakeholders in OPNAV (NPS liaison). 
Introduced team to numerous members of NIFC-
CA working group (Aegis, CEC, IAMD, SM-2, 
C2) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Name Organization / Feedback  
LCDR Lewis (COMPACFLT) / 
CDR Smith (COMPACFLT 
N9WAR) - UXS 
Feedback on potential capabilities of unmanned 
systems integration into future operations to 
include testing/scenarios through various 
underway exercises.   
Dr. Mary Ann Cummings 
(NSWC Dahlgren) 
Modeling Distributed Lethality (wargaming) and 
use of unmanned systems in the model. Feedback 
on NIFC-CA interoperability and integration.   
 
Table 7.   Second Outreach Responses (January 2016) 
Name Organization / Feedback  
LCDR Dwan (NSMWDC) Feedback on the applicability of this project to 
future warfighting and integration.   
LT Josh Mills (NSMWDC) Feedback on additional stakeholders, particularly 
DARPA.   
Dr. Looney (USFF N802) Feedback on NIFC-CA and possible relation to our 
project, particularly integrated fire control relay.   
LT Steve Perry (NSMWDC) Feedback on numerous areas for research and other 
stakeholders that support. 
Mr. CJ Toombs (NAVAIR 
China Lake) 
Heimdall overview and SE approach to unmanned 
systems integration for sensors, C2, and 
communications 
LCDR Gahl (OPNAV N96) Increased correspondence for stakeholders inputs 
in OPNAV. Feedback concerning our products and 
paths forward.   
LCDR Sandomir / LTJG 
O’Keefe (OPNAV N96Z / 
CRIC) 
Direct feedback on application of a SOS 
information relay system for enabling distributed 
lethality. Provided feedback on products and ways-
ahead for overall project  
CDR LaPointe /Mr. Chris 
Delmastro (DASN UXS) 
Significant feedback on integration of unmanned 
systems into naval operations including limitations 
and constraints.   
Mr. Horvath / Mr. Herbert 
(OPNAV N99) 
Significant feedback on SEA23 products and 
valuable input for way-ahead of project.   
Dr. Galambos / Dr. Sam Earp /    
Mr. Neidlinger  (DARPA) 
DARPA feedback for ongoing on future projects 
for incorporation into the “forward line sensors” of 
the SEA project. CDMaST / TERN / ACTUV  
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D. STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS 
A research trip taken in December to the Washington, DC, area for meetings with 
OPNAV N96, OPNAV N96Z, NSWC Dahlgren, OPNAV N99, and DASN Unmanned 
Systems (UxS) resulted in additional stakeholders added in January 2016. This trip 
allowed SEA23 to make personal connections with potential stakeholders. A second trip 
occurred during late February 2016. During the February trip, SEA23 met with 
stakeholders to outline and receive feedback on the current path to a solution. During the 
same travel period, interactions on campus continued. The following describes the 
information exchange with those stakeholders who provided the greatest feedback for 
scoping the direction of the project. 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF): The primary representative from 
CNSF was CAPT Charles “Chuck” Good who holds the Surface Warfare Officer Chair 
position at NPS. He is directly responsible for the collective of surface warfare officers 
on campus and serves as the direct liaison between the surface community and research at 
NPS. Through interactions and engagements with CAPT Good, the SEA23 team obtained 
direct feedback relating to the immediate impact to the surface community. Additionally, 
greater understanding of surface tactics and surface capabilities helped identify gaps and 
weaknesses for research. CAPT Good provided feedback tailored towards the direct 
applicability and feasibility of system components on individual unmanned platforms and 
relevance to the surface warfare community. Major feedback focused on detailed insight 
leading to research avenues for the SEA23 project, particularly for understanding the 
system of systems and the network components. For example, how does the system of 
systems “speak” to surface ships and integrate data exchange with surface ships. 
Understanding this provided greater insight into tactical data links: how they integrate, 
and how they operate with unmanned systems. Finally, he identified various limitations 
and constraints of unmanned systems integration for surface platforms. 
OPNAV N96 / N96 (Z) (Director Surface Warfare / Distributed Lethality 
Task Force): The primary representatives from OPNAV N96/N96Z were LCDR Chris 
Gahl and LTJG Christopher O’Keefe. They provided feedback and support for distributed 
lethality and how the project enhances the distributed lethality construct. Suggested areas 
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for research exploration were graceful degradation of systems, line of sight 
communications, and mesh networks. Additionally, the overall system shall focus on a 
reconstitutable system of systems, with unmanned node platforms capable of organic 
launch from surface ship platforms. The goal for the system of systems was to enhance 
distributed forces and lethality of forces in the surface force strategy. Application of the 
system of systems to an adaptive force package can help in integration and fleet practices. 
Finally, the suggestion was made that operational applicability can increase if the 
capabilities and architecture components of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter 
Air system were used on much smaller, agile, platforms (without the need for a nuclear 
carrier and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye command and control aircraft. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Unmanned Systems (DASN UxS):  
The primary representative from DASN UxS was CDR Cara Lapointe (Program 
Executive Office Ships, PMS 320). The DASN UxS office focuses on the future 
integration of unmanned systems into naval and military operations seeking to identify 
how unmanned systems can augment the role of current manned systems. One of the key 
goals for the employment of unmanned systems is to create an “organic away game” for 
distributed forces (ships) with the ability to have the full-scale coverage that a CVN 
provides, without the need for a CVN. They identified a capability gap that focuses on 
minimizing the overall “lag” time to the decision maker and the decision-making process 
and decision-making relay chain. By pairing manned-machine assets, focusing on 
increasing the speed of phases in war, decreasing the “pausing” time, and understanding 
how unmanned systems fit into the greater architecture picture, enhancements are 
possible. In the systems engineering process for unmanned systems integration, it is 
imperative that numerous iterative processes focus on the verification/validation/
accreditation as the future of unmanned systems continue to evolve. Research shall focus 
on identifying a global versus local framework and the effects and impacts of or to 
system degradation. A key to understanding unmanned systems are the physical domain 
interfaces—transition and cross-over points for relay of information from unmanned 
systems (i.e., tactical data link—how does the unmanned system “talk” to the ship?) 
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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations N99 Directorate for Unmanned 
Systems (OPNAV N99): The primary contacts at OPNAV N99 were CAPT Joe Horvath 
(USN, ret.) the Deputy for Rapid System Development and Mr. Gary Herbert. An 
immediate input point was to focus on line of sight communications and improving 
NIFC-CA through unmanned systems. OPNAV N99 first raised awareness and provided 
insight into the concept of denied, degraded, intermittent, and low-bandwidth (DDIL) 
environments and operating constraints within an A2AD construct. They desired to 
increase the operational capability of the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). The 
framework of the system of systems shall focus on the components of agility and 
resiliency. OPNAV N99 recommended adjustment of the project to focus on the 
minimum requirement of UAV node platforms and not specific available systems. This is 
accomplished by exploring a different problem space and working to investigate the full 
scale of cross-domain operations. Additionally, focus shall include information relay and 
information sharing between unmanned systems. 
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency): The primary 
representatives from DARPA were Dr. Jim Galambos (Program Manager Strategic 
Technologies Office (STO)), Mr. Rick Neidlinger (DARPA STO Maritime/Aviation 
Support) and Dr. Samuel Earp (DARPA STO). Their feedback focused on using 
components of numerous DARPA related research and inputs for technical injects and 
forward-looking sensor platforms (TERN) in the systems engineering analysis 
architecture and construct. The Cross Domain Maritime Surveillance and Targeting 
(CDMaST) (Figure 7) project aligns well with the SEA23 research. It was determined 
that understanding the full Detect-to-Engage (DTE) sequence was imperative to 
identifying weaknesses/vulnerabilities in the U.S. ability to conduct offensive operations. 
DARPA was able to provide feedback that helped inform the system of systems 
constraints and limitations. Additionally, many different concepts were suggested for 
further exploration including architecture, requirements, constraints, unmanned versus 
manned systems, cost restraints, data relay, concept of operations, “kill web,” measures 
of effectiveness, and measures of performance. The DARPA representatives suggested 
that SEA23 differentiate between the optimization of the individual node systems and the 
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optimization of the system of systems network. Separating the two is best to ensure 
understanding the intricacies, limitations, constraints, and capabilities of the network 
versus the platforms. 
 
Figure 7.  Cross Domain Maritime Surveillance and Targeting (CDMaST) 
Conceptual Drawing. Source Galambos (2016). 
Naval Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (NSMWDC): The 
primary representatives from NSMWDC were LT Josh Mills and LT Steve Perry. 
NSMWDC focuses on reinvigorating tactical excellence in the surface warfare 
community through the development and adoption of enhanced surface warfare tactics. 
They provided greater fidelity on distributed lethality and NIFC-C. NSMWDC writes and 
validates naval doctrine and tactics for the fleet, which helped SEA23, identify current 
challenges, constraints, and requirements. An area suggested for future research is 
integration of the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft as an 
information relay within the system of systems. They also advocated the use of 
establishing mobile ad hoc mesh networks. Exploration into these areas, particularly for 
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requirements, will be substantial in providing a way forward for future technological 
integration.  
NPS Chair of Mine Warfare, Systems Engineering, RADM Rick Williams (USN, 
Retired) works directly with mine warfare and undersea warfare systems at NPS. RADM 
Williams explained student research at NPS and its support to naval operations. 
Additionally, he reviewed the necessary systems engineering components for determining 
specific information for platforms. RADM Williams emphasized the expectation of 
degradation for positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, but not their total loss 
when operating in South China Sea and an A2AD environment. Systems engineering 
shall focus on the range, size, and weight constraints of systems, as well as the limitations 
associated with those requirements. For purposes of scoping and analyzing, he 
recommended identifying a single concept of operation and then viewing and reviewing 
that concept from multiple perspectives, addressing the questions: what assumptions were 
made? What modifications were made? What were the primary issues? What were the 
common issues? What are the capabilities and limitations in each domain?  What are the 
major (or most common) constraints? By answering these questions and removing 
variables, SEA23 can adjust the scenario during problem development. 
Stakeholder feedback and interaction, started early and, was pivotal throughout 
our project. Maintaining an open dialogue with stakeholders helped to provide feedback 
and insight ensuring that the team remained on track and aligned with stakeholders’ 
requirements and needs. SEA23’s analysis addressed the primary stakeholder needs 
driving the project and the developed solution. 
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III. SCOPE 
A. SCOPE METHODOLOGY 
At their outset, most projects are too open ended for serious qualitative analysis 
and development. The SEA23 team’s tasking was not atypical in this regard. Prior to any 
analysis, the team had to determine what the problem actually was and where its 
boundaries were. Placing boundaries on a project through in-depth discussions with the 
project’s sponsor helps identify their actual goals and desired outcomes from the study. 
The sponsor often makes the problem statement as open ended as possible to allow the 
project team to determine the best approach for project completion. At times, the sponsor 
does not fully understand their problem. The team must present their determinations for 
the project’s problem and their plan to solve it. 
The project team had to limit the scope of their project based on the resources 
available to them at the time. These were time, funding, and personnel. Of these, time 
was a heavy influencer on what the project team was able to accomplish. Time 
constraints are not always a detriment to the project, as it requires a focus on developing 
and providing a product that is usable to the sponsor. SEA23 wanted to provide a solution 
that can join the fleet within the next 10–15 years. This allowed the team to focus on 
concepts and technologies that are currently in use in the fleet or will reach anticipated 
initial operation capability within that timeframe. 
B. IN SCOPE 
CAPT Jeffrey Kline (USN Retired), NPS’ Systems Engineering Analysis 
curriculum chair and OPNAV N9I representative, in a memorandum dated 07 July 2015, 
presented SEA23’s tasking: 
Design a fleet system of systems and concept of operations for 
employment of a cost effective and resilient unmanned and manned 
system capable of allowing cross-domain targeting information in a 
contested area in the 2025–2030 timeframe. Consider manned and 
unmanned systems in all domains to provide sufficient information to 
support effective tactical offensive operations by air, surface, undersea, 
and cyber. Explore how unmanned systems may contribute to cross-
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domain information exchange to support navy fires or to create an “all 
domain” naval integrated fire control capability to create an asymmetric 
warfighting advantage in a contested environment. Explore alternatives in 
adaptive self-governing communications networks from T1-like capability 
to a ‘thin-line’ getting the target coordinates through capacity. Consider 
employment requirements, operating areas, bandwidth, connectivity, 
interoperability, sensor data basing support in forward areas or from 
CONUS bases and joint contributions. Generate system requirements for 
platforms, sensors, and communications in a challenging EM 
environment. Develop alternative architectures for platforms, sensors, 
manning, command and control, intelligence collection/dissemination and 
consumption, communication and network connectivity, and operational 
procedures. Address the costs and effectiveness of your alternatives in 
mission areas like at-sea strike and electronic maneuver warfare. 
From this statement, three key themes emerged from the problem statement: 
unmanned systems, cross-domain information exchange, and the concept of “all domain.” 
During SEA23’s first meetings, discussion focused primarily on what this meant. These 
were the first steps taken to determine the scope of the project. Using discussions with the 
project sponsors and through the cohort’s own brainstorming, a focused problem 
statement emerged. SEA23 presented it to CAPT Kline prior to the initial interim 
progress review on 04 February 2016.  
SEA23 will investigate a concept of operations in a contested environment 
using modular unmanned and manned platforms capable of carrying 
communications and data suites to enable cross-domain targeting 
information in support of Tactical Offensive Operations (TOO) in a 
contested, denied, degraded, intermittent, and limited bandwidth (DDIL) 
environment. The focus areas that this updated problem statement 
identified are:  
• Cross Domain Targeting, 
• Tactical Offensive Operations, 
• Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited (DDIL) bandwidth environment, 
• Modularity. (Kline 2015) 
The key to understanding why each of these areas is important starts with the 
operational environment. During military operations in the early 1990s, military 
operations began incorporating satellite communications (SATCOM), but they remained 
a member of the supporting cast, not a key pillar. Contrasting this with current military 
operations, SATCOM is an essential component to Command and Control (C2), 
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing (PNT) (Lapic et al. 2013). With such reliance on satellites, it is not surprising that 
potential adversaries are testing methods for eliminating that element. In 2007, China 
successfully used land based missiles to destroy an aging satellite (Lapic et al. 2013). In 
light of this threat, the U.S. and her allies must look for ways to reduce dependence on 
satellite capabilities. SPAWAR calls this a shift in focus from ashore Network Operations 
Centers to the strike group afloat (Lapic et al. 2013). SEA 23’s project tasking helps to 
support that shift. 
1. DDIL and A2AD Environments 
The DDIL and A2AD environments are of increasing concern to the U.S. and its 
allies. Broken into two parts, A2AD creates the situation where a force cannot move into 
a theatre or operate freely in an area due to enemy control (Tangredi 2013). This is not a 
new concept, but the methods for creating this environment have evolved throughout 
history. Five key pieces need to be in place for an adversary to create this situation 
according to Sam Tangredi in Anti-Access Warfare. These elements are defense against 
a superior adversary, role of geography, maritime domain as the conflict space, criticality 
of information and intelligence, impact of extrinsic events (to include DIME) (Tangredi, 
2013). DDIL contributes to an A2AD strategy by affecting the information and 
intelligence available to a combatant. With the loss of the SATCOM link, the strike group 
must have an organic means of relaying information at ranges that place the units outside 
the reach of adversary shore based missile defenses. This range has increased in the past 
two decades from 70 NM to over 700 NM (Eckstein 2016). The combination of these 
elements makes the ability of naval operations in geographic areas, which have natural 
boundaries more difficult, such as bays or marginal seas (e.g., the South China Sea). 
2. Cross Domain Targeting 
Cross Domain Targeting is a concept that uses all available assets to conduct the 
range of operations encompassing a “detect-to-engage” sequence. In a contested DDIL 
and A2AD environment, naval vessels must avoid the use of electronic transmissions to 
prevent detection. This includes high-power radars and communications that can be either 
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detected or jammed. Other means of passing target information need to be available to 
the warfighter so they can remain effective while remaining undetected. Cross-Domain 
Fires aim to harness system of systems architectures to this effect. It allows the passing of 
targeting information between combatants like the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter 
Air while operating in a passive mode. DARPA describes it as a disaggregation of 
functions across multiple platforms (Galambos 2016).  
3. Tactical Offensive Operations 
According to the Naval Doctrine Publication 1,  
The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, 
and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or 
task forces. Activities focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of 
combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve 
combat objectives. (NDP1 2010) 
The phrase refers to those maneuvers that occur in this level of war. For many years, the 
Navy has focused on defending against incoming threats, but with re-arming and 
emerging peer competitor navies, there must be a shift towards taking the fight to the 
enemy and tactical offensive operations is an effort to re-emphasize this. Tactical 
offensive operations are in the category of power projection, which “includes a broad 
spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or 
to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons range of friendly 
forces” (NDP1 2010). 
4. Modularity 
As defined by Webster’s, when something is modular it is “having parts that can 
be connected or combined in different ways” (Webster’s Dictionary, 2016). SEA23 
applies this concept to both the individual units in the system as well as to the system of 
systems. The team intends that the mission payload will be self-contained and usable in, 
or on, any number of platforms, both manned and unmanned, thus the modular design. 
This concept then persists to the system of systems that has a modular “plug and play” 
capability where available assets can form ad hoc networks to communicate and relay 
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data. This modularity creates a flexible system of systems that has self-healing 
characteristics to maximize network availability with these characteristics: 
• relay of “target quality” data 
• line-of-sight communications 
• system of system mesh network architecture 
• minimization of the use of manned assets 
• data throughput 
 
C. OUT OF SCOPE 
Through a similar process, SEA23 identified and bounded what the study does not 
cover. The team based these boundaries on what they could accomplish during the 
project’s timeframe and what capabilities are already in existence. The primary boundary 
imposed on the project was that it would focus only on the communications relay 
element, not the detection or the engagement pieces. The focus will be on the “to” of the 
detect-to-engage sequence. Past and future projects have been dedicated to discussing and 
studying both detection and engagement, and it was determined that including them will 
create too broad of a study. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis of system requirements begins with identifying the design 
criteria that allows the system to perform its mission. It starts with analysis of system 
requirements that results in identification of top-level system functions. Decomposing 
these further decomposed identifies component design criteria and constraints. Functional 
architecture development uses functional flow block diagrams (FFBD) that integrate and 
align the functions needed to form the functional baseline of the system (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011, 100). 
SEA23 selected a team with expertise on the systems engineering and systems 
architecting processes. The team identified that the communications network must 
integrate into existing systems due to initial operational capability of 2025 to 2030 
because today’s systems will still be in service at that time. The Huynh and Osmundson 
System of Systems Architecture Development Process (SoSADP) model was used to 
develop the system architecture and for verification and validation using modeling and 
simulation (Figure 8). This model identified critical components for completing the 
architecture and assessing its performance through modeling and simulation. 
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Figure 8.  The Layered Structure of the SOS Architecture Development Process 
(SoSADP). Source: Huynh and Osmundson (2007). 
A. ARCHITECTURE 
A system architecture provides the high-level design of a system addressing 
stakeholder needs, ensuring all components and subsystems work together, and 
explaining the trade-offs required to meet stakeholder needs. The system architecture 
visually communicates the system design to stakeholders, confirming stakeholder needs 
while also simplifying complex systems. Rechtin and Maier (2009) describe architecture 
as, “The structure in terms of components, connections, and constraints—of a product, 
process, or element” (415). The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) 
defines systems architecture as, “The fundamental and unifying system structure defined 
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in terms of system elements, interfaces, processes, constraints, and behaviors” (Maier and 
Rechtin 2009, 417)). 
The architecture for the unmanned system relay network is important in 
illustrating how the system processes and interfaces help to complete the mission. It helps 
define the constraints the SOS will have while conducting the mission. Critical 
operational issues (COI) that will affect the capabilities of the system can be determined 
during the development of system architecture. The DODAF is able to relate to the steps 
of the Huynh and Osmundson SoSADP model used by the team. SEA23 started with 
Vitech’s system engineering software, CORE, for system architecture development, but it 
was not adequate in facilitating a team based architecture design process (Vitech 2016). 
For this reason, SEA23 decided to use Innoslate, a systems engineering and requirements 
tool developed by SPEC Innovations, for the design of the system architecture because of 
its Internet-based collaborative environment and built-in DODAF product templates 
(SPEC Innovations 2016). Innoslate allowed access for all team members to update and 
make changes to the DODAF products. 
B. ANALYSIS OF TASKING STATEMENT 
The tasking statement determined key areas to decompose for requirements 
development. The analysis focus areas from the tasking statement are: 
• exchange cross domain targeting information, 
• support tactical offensive operations, 
• use of manned and unmanned systems. 
Exchange of cross-domain targeting information is a key focus area because this 
capability allows the SOS to receive and transmit target data from any domain. 
Supporting effective tactical offensive operations gives the SOS the capability to engage 
the targets contained in the targeting information. Finally, SEA23 selected the use of 
manned and unmanned systems as another key focus area to show that the SOS can 
consist of both types. Identifying these areas allowed the analysis and decomposition of 
the functions associated with each key focus area. 
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C. OPERATIONAL VIEW-1 (OV-1) 
The OV-1 is the High-Level Operational Graphic within DODAF (Figure 9). The 
OV-1 is a pictorial representation and describes the scenario concept. It conveys the 
scope and context of the architecture to the decision maker. The OV-1 had multiple 
iterations throughout architecture development. The final OV-1 may not be produced 
until after the system architecture is complete (DODCIO 2010). 
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Figure 9.  High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1).
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The OV-1 supports interoperability between platforms to enable line-of-sight 
(LOS) communication and information relay. The unmanned vessels (UxV) “Fire Web” 
receive an input from a domain sensor (such as pictures, radar information, or video). The 
UxV “Fire Web” is then able to transmit the message across the various UxV platforms 
until it can output the information to a ship within the surface action group (SAG) or 
command and control (C2) element. Information from the SAG or C2 element can also 
send information to sensor platforms through the UxV “Fire web.” The problems’ scope 
extends to the reception of targeting information from a sensing node to its 
communication to the SAG through the “Fire Web.” 
D. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION OF KEY FOCUS AREAS  
SEA23 decided that the most effective decomposition uses the Universal Naval 
Task List (UNTL) to identify the operational tasks needed to conduct Communications, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (CISR) (OPNAV 2007). The team used 
the UNTL to identify the lower level tasks that went into the operations of CISR. CORE 
architecture software helped develop this functional decomposition. The decomposition 
assisted SEA23 in scoping the problem to design a system of systems to send effective 
targeting communications “over-the-horizon” through organic and unmanned means. 
SEA23 used the temporal view operations template for an air interdiction 
operation from the UNTL in the initial phases of the functional analysis and 
decomposition of the system requirements to support tactical offensive operations. This 
template offered an illustrative view of the sequence of tasks that are necessary when 
conducting air interdiction. SEA23 realized that not all tasks are required for the CISR 
requirements of the system and determined that Assemble Forces in the Joint Operations 
Area (OP 1.2.3), Prepare Plans/Orders (OP 5.3.9), Collect Target Information (NTA 
2.2.1), Transmit and Receive Information (NTA 5.1.1.1), and Provide Intelligence 
Support to Targeting (NTA 2.4.5.5) are the tasks associated with CISR (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.  An Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation Used for 
Functional Decomposition Adapted from: OPNAV (2007). 
SEA23 found that CORE allows for development of detailed architecture 
frameworks but lacked collaboration capability (Figure 11). A new functional 
decomposition used Innoslate, which revealed that the functions of CISR were outside 
the requirements from the tasking statement. Although the initial decomposition did not 
provide a good functional baseline for the system, it did provide critical insights to scope 
the problem. It was determined that the problem was the transfer of targeting information 
from a sensor to a command and control (C2) element and then information back to the 
sensor or shooter. The manned and unmanned systems were the platforms that will 
provide the means to transfer the information. Using unmanned systems for targeting 
information transfer helped meet the goal of reducing risk to manned platforms while 
operating in a contested environment. Therefore, the top-level function that the SOS 
needs to perform is Employ Remote Vehicles (NTA 1.1.2.5). 
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Figure 11.  Initial Functional Decomposition Based on the Operations Template for Air Interdiction Operation.
 45 
E. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION (OV-5A)  
The DODAF OV-5a functional decomposition is the Activity Decomposition 
Tree. It describes the breakdown of high-level activities (i.e., functions) into low-level 
activities and is useful as an aid for the development of the OV-5b also known as the 
functional flow block diagram (FFBD) (DODCIO 2010). 
1. Top-Level Functions 
The primary function of employ remote vehicles is “the operation of vehicles such 
as robots, drones, unmanned underwater vehicle (UUVs), unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), and other devices from a local control station” (OPNAV 2007, 3-B-7). The 
employment of remote vehicles requires the deployment, launch, operation, and recovery 
of the remote vehicle(s). These functions became the detailed functions that allowed for 
further decomposition of the task of employing remote vehicles (Figures 12 and 13). 
Appendix C lists these functions. 
 
Figure 12.  High-Level Functions of the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) Task 
of Employ Remote Vehicles. 
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Figure 13.  Functional Decomposition of the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) 
Task of Employ Remote Vehicles. 
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2. Operational Activity Model (OV-5b) 
The OV-5b is the Activity Model in DODAF that describes the operational flow 
of the functions conducted in order to accomplish a mission. It shows the connections 
between activities through resource inputs/outputs, as well as the “to and from” tasks that 
are outside the scope of the problem. The OV-5b can identify issues that were not clearly 
present in the OV-5a (functional decomposition) (DODCIO 2010). 
The OV-5b for the employment of UAVs identified key resource inputs/outputs 
as well as maintenance and pre-flight tasks (Figure 14). The OV-5b was designed using 
the functional flow between deploy, launch, operate, and recover high-level functions. 
The deploy, launch, operate, and recover is a loop sequence that begins when a SAG is in 
position to launch communication UAVs and ends once the “over-the-horizon” 
communication mission is complete. The loop begins with conducting maintenance. A 
weather check uses weather data as an input following mission receipt. If the weather is 
bad, the UAV goes back to maintenance. If the weather is good, the launch and recovery 
systems can be set up. Next, the crew performs pre-flight checks on the UAV, launch, 
and recovery equipment. If any pre-flight check fails, the UAV and equipment go to 
maintenance. At the same time, intelligence provides updates on the threat, data relay, 
and team configuration information. Receipt of all necessary mission information 
prompts uplink to the UAV. Launch personnel position the UAV for launch and clear the 
airspace if all pre-flight checks are good and then they launch the UAV. 
The UAV will determine its flight altitude and airspeed, as well as receive 
coordinate information in order to determine its current location and then move to a new 
waypoint based on the mission data upload. This process loops until the UAV is at its 
final destination. Once the UAV is at its final destination, it will determine loitering time 
based on remaining power information. If it has the required power, it will start its 
communication loop. This loop consists of the UAV receiving an incoming signal, 
processing the data, and then transmitting that data to a receiver. This loop continues until 
the power level reaches to the UAV’s minimum threshold value. Then, the crew confirms 
its suitability for recovery. The SAG tracks the UAV and deploys equipment to retrieve 
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the UAV. The UAV then enters maintenance and the loop begins again. Figure 14 shows 
the overall process while Figures 15–18 provide detail. 
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Figure 15.  Deploy Sub-functions of the Activity Model (OV-5b). 
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Figure 16.  Launch Sub-functions of the Activity Model (OV-5b). 
 
Figure 17.  Operate Sub-functions of the Activity Model (OV-5b). 
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Figure 18.  Recover Sub-functions of the Activity Model (OV-5b). 
The OV-5b helped illustrate the deploy, launch, operate, and recover process that 
is required to complete the communication “Fire Web.” The required information inputs/
outputs and decisions outlined the internal and external processes that must be considered 
for the communication “Fire Web.” These internal and external processes and 
information needs helped in deriving the critical operational issues for the system of 
systems. The development of the OV-5b also made it easier to design models and 
simulations to verify the deploy, launch, operate, and recover process. 
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V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A realistic framework which to consider system attributes and requirements, to 
weigh against a real-world tangible challenge was needed to focus the open ended 
theoretical statements found in the original tasking letter. Using a narrative driven 
problem, SEA23 tempered the technical discussions with reality, inspiring the team to 
think practically when considering what technologies and potential solutions will be 
available for the solution space. The concept of operations process defines what, why, 
who, where, when, and how the system will be used. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) use 
the building of missions as a part of developing system operational requirements.  
Once the need and technical approach have been defined, it is necessary to 
translate this into some form of an “operational scenario,” or a set of 
operational requirements. At this point, the following questions may be 
asked: What are the anticipated types and quantities of equipment, 
software, personnel, facilities, information, and so on, required, and 
where are they to be located? How is the system to be utilized, and for 
how long? What is the anticipated environment at each operational site 
(user location)? What are the expected interoperability requirements (i.e., 
interfaces with other “operating” systems in the area)? How is the system 
to be supported, by whom, and for how long? The answer to these and 
comparable questions leads to the definition of system operational 
requirements, the follow-on maintenance and support concept, and the 
identification of specific design-to criteria and related guidelines. (61, 
emphasis in original) 
Building the scenario was not easy, but significant help came from the shared 
classes and workshops in which SEA23 participated. The team used a scenario similar to 
the OA4602 Joint Campaign Analysis and OA4604 Wargaming Applications courses, as 
well as the CRUSER Warfare Innovation Workshop. As the project progressed, so too 
did the scenario development to stay in line with the prescribed capability. 
A. NARRATIVE 
CAPT Kline developed the scenario presented during OA4602, OA4604, and the 
Warfare Innovation Workshop. “Maritime War of 2030” focuses primarily on Chinese 
and Russian expansionism in the first Pacific Island chain and in the Baltic Sea, 
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respectively (Kline 2015). SEA23 decided that it was a natural starting point and that it 
applies with minor modification. The problems presented by the contest in the littorals by 
regional hegemons fit well with the goals of integrating cross-domain naval fires using 
unmanned systems. In both the South China Sea and the Baltic Sea, the expectation is of 
a regional power creating an Anti-Access and Area Denial Environment. In a localized 
area, adversaries can challenge U.S. forces from accessing a designated international sea 
by use of long range, anti-ship missiles launched from land, surface ships, and 
submarines. The second half of the A2AD environment, area-denial, can be done through 
methods such as GPS denial. SEA23 focused on the China portion of the scenario to 
shape its study. 
In 2030, China has overtaken the United States as the largest GDP in the world 
but is continuing to seek natural resources to expand its economic base at home. The 
political, fiscal, economic, and military expansions that China began in the early 2000s 
has continued and accelerated, in large part because of cooling tensions between 
mainland China and Taiwan that have led to stronger economic and social ties. By 2030, 
the two are essentially a singularly governed body. Taiwan has allowed China to build 
military installations on Taiwan to include high frequency surface wave radar systems 
and passive collection systems. Because of the increasingly closer ties between China and 
Taiwan, Taiwan has begun purchasing the bulk of its military goods from the People’s 
Republic of China. This expansion onto Taiwan by the Chinese has allowed them 
increased ability to monitor and track naval surface traffic moving into the South China 
Sea from the East Philippine Sea. 
Continuing the process begun in the 2010s, China has built multiple islands 
throughout the South China Sea. The militarization of the islands occurred rapidly with 
the addition of military airfields, as well as naval refueling and refitting capabilities. 
Additionally, multiple reef islands “have both surface to air installations (S-500) and anti-
surface cruise missile mobile sites (advanced YJ-62s)” (Kline 2015). China has also 
threatened the invasion of Palawan, Philippines and Natuna Besar, Indonesia. Due to 
Natuna Besar’s central location in the South China Sea, China can effectively monitor 
and track all surface vessel traffic moving through the South China Sea. With the man-
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made islands and the possible invasions, China positioned itself to make good on their 
threats to prohibit international traffic through its claimed territorial waters encompassing 
the “Nine Dash Line” (Keck 2014) (Figure 19). China has warned that external 
interference in the territorial claims disputes will lead to open conflict, leaving open the 
possibility of nuclear escalation.  
 
Figure 19.  China’s Nine Dash Line Claims in the South China Sea. 
Source: Keck (2014). 
The United States has continued to increase its ties with other partner nations in 
the region as part of the Pacific pivot begun during the Obama administration. Japan and 
the United States have strengthening social, economic, and military connections with 
additional littoral combat ships (LCS) home-ported in both Yokosuka and Sasebo to 
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supplement the carrier strike group (CSG) and expeditionary strike group (ESG) 
stationed in each respective location. United States forces have maintained their presence 
on the Korean peninsula; however, the warming of North and South Korea relations 
lessens the need for an extensive troop presence. Bordering the South China Sea, the 
Philippines continue to look to the U.S. to support their interests in the face of Chinese 
aggression. Along with Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Subic Bay, Republic of the 
Philippines, is one of the U.S.’s primary logistics staging bases in the region. The re-
opening of Clark Air Force Base provides U.S. forces with an expeditionary base in the 
area of responsibility. The city-state of Singapore has also allowed the enlargement of the 
U.S. presence on it. There is now a squadron of eight LCS homeported on the island as 
well as a squadron of P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, the Marine Corps has 
expanded its presence in Darwin, Australia, to a battalion landing team (BLT). These 
regional allies have requested United Nations assistance in countering the Chinese threat, 
specifically from Japan and the United States. Because of the current Chinese military 
emplacements, U.S. forces must be able to maintain command and control linkages while 
operating with an offensive-mindset.  
1. Understanding the Narrative 
This narrative presents an operating environment drastically different from what 
many current active duty naval officers face. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the United States has been the singular world power and has had no peer competitor. For 
the past 15 years, American forces have responded to an insurgent asymmetric threat, 
allowing regional powers an opportunity to gain a larger role in the world. China’s strong 
historic and nationalist views have perpetuated the once third world nation into an 
economically vibrant country with the ability to support regional expansionism, with 
ever-increasing means of reaching out to the world. Though the two nations have strong 
economic ties, China and the United States do not agree on many foreign policy issues. 
The South China Sea has many factors that make it especially vulnerable to 
conflict. First, throughout it are multiple resources rich areas. The region is “rich with 
fish and is believed to hold huge oil and gas reserves beneath the seabed” (McDowell 
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2011). Since there are at least seven nations that have competing claims to at least parts 
of the sea, the potential for conflict is high. There are also major commercial sea-lanes 
running through it from the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Singapore in the southern 
entrances to the Formosa and Luzon Straits in the north drawing outside attention. The 
area is no longer simply a regional squabble. Because China is the largest and most 
capable of the competing nations, most others look to the U.S. as a counterbalance. This 
is why China is actively pursuing means to prevent the U.S. Navy from operating freely 
throughout the South China Sea. 
2. Tactical Situation 
The current model for U.S. Navy surface operations centers on the aircraft carrier, 
a construct that has existed since the Second World War. Accompanying the carrier are a 
guided missile cruiser, at least one guided missile destroyer, and often a Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) supply ship. Since each carrier costs over $10 billion U.S. dollars and 
has over 5000 sailors stationed aboard, the loss of one of these vessels is unacceptable. 
China has the ability to track and target these large ships from hundreds of miles away 
using bases on their mainland, as well as from their smaller man-made islands. The basic 
building block of U.S. naval operations must change to counter the new threats. 
Additionally, the U.S.’ reliance upon GPS is under threat because of the potential 
adversary’s demonstrated ability to disable satellites and create a DDIL environment. The 
Navy must overcome the challenges presented by DDIL by being prepared to operate 
using the concept of graceful degradation. In a paper written for the 18th International 
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Dr. Jonathan Czarnecki of 
the Naval War College and Colonel K. Todd Chamberlain of the Army Capabilities 
Integration Center describe graceful degradation as a complement of resilience, 
robustness, and redundancy. 
Graceful degradation, or fault tolerance in engineering terms, refers to the 
ability of systems to continue functioning, at least for a time, after critical 
processes or sub-systems are compromised or destroyed. One popular 
concept of recent times, resilience, attempts to capture the graceful 
degradation idea. However, resilience is insufficient to account for a 
system that has the quality of graceful degradation. Two other related 
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concepts, robustness and redundancy, complement resilience. (Czarnecki 
and Chamberlain 2013) 
Practically speaking, this means that sailors must be able to use a variety of 
different systems to operate their weapons systems using both organic and inorganic 
resources. This is a shift in tactical thinking. Sailors must return to solving problems as a 
relative movement between vessels, not with exact geo-locations from GPS. SEA23 took 
the concept of adaptive force packages to create tactical force structures, which aims to 
pair the right resources for the tasking at hand. Former NPS student Sean Bergesen 
explored this concept, then known as Adaptive Joint Force Packaging, in detail in his 
1993 master’s thesis. 
A new force planning and employment concept is now being developed 
which attempts to address some of the more difficult challenges presented 
by the post-Cold War security environment and attendant reductions to the 
U.S. military force structure. This concept, known as Adaptive Joint Force 
Packaging (AJFP), intends to address those challenges by “packaging” 
forces drawn from any or all of the individual Services into new, and in 
many cases, unconventional combinations. (Bergesen 1993) 
The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command made this concept official doctrine 
in 2012 and the Navy Surface Forces command is conducting operational studies to build 
a similar doctrine. A SAG and an AFP are distinct entities. A SAG is comprised of 
cruisers, destroyers, and littoral combat ships or frigates with a specific mission while the 
AFP can be made of any number of different vessels to meet any potential mission. An 
AFP can consist of two “shooters,” either destroyers or cruisers, and one slightly larger 
ship that will have a high capacity for carrying unmanned systems (UAVs or potentially 
USVs or UUVs). This provides offensive and communications capability for lethal fires 
without endangering the aircraft carrier. The AFP will carry a number of UAVs that will 
form a relay line-of-sight network that can stretch up to and beyond 500 nautical miles 
linking detection assets to the missile firing vessels. The assets that will be detecting the 
adversary will be manned and unmanned vehicles, autonomous vehicles, though this 
detection system is outside the SEA23 project’s scope. For analytical purposes in 
providing a system lower bound for UAV capacity, SEA23 selected a three-DDG AFP to 
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support in this scenario. The team decided this based on which current Navy assets have 
the least amount of flight deck and hangar space available. 
B. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES, MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, 
AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
In the development of new military equipment, the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) require the explicit definition of what that item shall 
be able to do. The Key Performance Parameters (KPP) are the performance traits of the 
future system (DAU 2013). The team identified three types of KPPs. They are Critical 
Operational Issues (COI), Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and Measures of 
Performance (MOP). COIs, MOEs, and MOPs are essential to the building of an effective 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The Defense Acquisition University glossary 
defines them.  
1. Critical Operational Issues (COI)  
COIs are key operational effectiveness or suitability issues that must be 
examined in operational test and evaluation to determine the system’s 
capability to perform its mission. COIs must be relevant to the required 
capabilities and of key importance to the system being operationally 
effective, operationally suitable and survivable, and represent a significant 
risk if not satisfactorily resolved. A COI/COIC is normally phrased as a 
question that must be answered in the affirmative to properly evaluate 
operational effectiveness (e.g., “Will the system detect the threat in a 
combat environment at adequate range to allow successful engagement?”) 
and operational suitability (e.g., “Will the system be safe to operate in a 
combat environment?). COIs/COICs are critical elements or operational 
mission objectives that must be examined, are related to Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Suitability (MOS), and are included 
in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). (DAU Glossary 2016) 
2. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
The data used to measure the military effect (mission accomplishment) 
that comes from using the system in its expected environment. That 
environment includes the system under test and all interrelated systems, 
that is, the planned or expected environment in terms of weapons, sensors, 
command and control, and platforms, as appropriate, needed to 
accomplish an end-to-end mission in combat. (DAU Glossary 2016) 
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3. Measures of Performance (MOP) 
System-particular performance parameters such as speed, payload, range, 
time-on-station, frequency, or other distinctly quantifiable performance 
features. Several MOPs may be related to the achievement of a particular 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). (DAU Glossary 2016) 
The challenges of the A2AD and DDIL environment in the South China Sea 
guided development of critical operational issues, measures of effectiveness, measures of 
performance, and data requirements. For example, development of the COI1 “Will the 
system reliably and quickly relay target-quality data?” occurred with MOEs like 
“Minimize relay time within the node platform” and MOPs like “Time for input/output of 
relay signal shall be less than that of government off-the-shelf (GOTS) specifications” in 
mind. A data requirement is then to measure delay time for signal transfer. The complete 
list of COIs, MOEs, MOPs, and DRs is found in Appendix D. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. GOAL  
The SEA23’s analysis of alternatives provides sponsors and stakeholders with a 
concise set of alternatives for networks and platforms. By modeling the system of system 
with various physical constraints, the number of platforms (nodes) required to cover an 
area can be determined using ExtendSim simulations. Selecting the 72-hour timeframe 
ensures the system is stressed during analysis. Currently, the carrier air wing (CVW) can 
provide approximately 17 hours of continuous coverage before requiring a break. If the 
system can work over a 72-hour period, it will not have issues working shorter periods. 
SEA23 assumes that the manned systems will not be productive in combat beyond that 
period based on current DDG manning. 
The goal is to find the minimum number of nodes required for a 72-hour mission. 
SEA23 defines a node as each communications UAV used in the “Fire Web.” The fewer 
nodes in the system, the more efficient it will be. This approach lowers the cost and 
reduces complexity; however, it leaves the system more susceptible to failures and hostile 
action. Additionally, not all networks will interact with other systems (such as ships and 
aircraft) in the same way. Some network types will require a more complex integration 
plan in order to communicate effectively. The project team will show various alternatives 
and recommended courses of action based on modeling and simulation. 
B. APPROACH  
From SEA23’s discussions with sponsors and stakeholders, it was clear that an 
analysis of various platforms capable of carrying network equipment would be required. 
While the project focused on unmanned systems that comprise the larger systems-of-
systems network, SEA23 could not disregard the network hardware (payload). A change 
in the payload will affect the requirements for the platform and a platform change can 
affect the payload it can carry. This caused some initial friction in the development of an 
analysis plan.  
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A plan was developed that can balance these competing interests. This required 
independent analysis of the various physical constraints and the limitations of the 
networks themselves. These were combined together to find the feasible number of nodes 
to constrain the simulation and provide realistic output. A summary of the analytical steps 
follows. 
1. Perform Tactical Datalink (TDL) tradeoff analysis. 
2. Match platforms to datalinks. 
3. Determine minimum number of nodes. 
4. Constrain with Horizon Limitations. 
5. Constrain with Surface Action Group capacity limitations based on 
platform analysis. 
6. Perform Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability simulation. 
C. CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
For the purposes of this project, constraints were hard restrictions imposed by 
either institutional policies of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Systems Engineering 
and Analysis Department chair, or the sponsor, OPNAV N9I. SEA23 derived constraints 
from the tasking statement or from sponsor and department chair interviews summarized 
here: 
• Study must remain unclassified due to foreign national involvement. 
• Study must be completed on or before 17 June 2016. 
• Study will focus on the platform architecture rather than the network 
architecture. 
• Solution shall be feasible within the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
• Solution shall be domain agnostic. 
1. Limitations 
Limitations are items left incomplete due to time constraints or classification 
issues. Several of these limitations resulted in an assumption. The limitations follow. 
1. Precision Navigation and Timing (i.e., GPS) solutions overcoming the 
denied or degraded environment were not studied. Completion of the 
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study is not feasible in nine-months because of its complexity. See 
Assumptions 7–8. 
2. Data classification levels prevented study of the undersea warfare domain. 
The addition of DARPA and other advanced projects into the scenario 
allowed the team to assume that they can handle the acoustic to radio 
frequency transition. See Assumptions 17–18. 
3. The project was scoped to only look at the “to” section of Detect-to-
Engage. Therefore, detection information, command and control and 
kinetic fires will be inputs and outputs to the studied system of systems. 
4. SEA23 did not study the effects of cyber-attacks because of classification 
and time constraints. 
2. Assumptions 
SEA23 defined an assumption as a statement that is made and taken as fact solely 
for this study. Due to the project’s complexity and unclassified nature, it will be 
impossible to know every fact required to analyze alternatives and model the scenario. 
SEA23 researched the subsystem performance data at the open source level because of 
the international students on the team. The team consulted stakeholders when data was 
not available. Classified data required SEA23 to make assumptions based on experience. 
The goal was to create a working model that can be updated when better data was 
acquired achieving more accurate results. The project’s assumptions follow. 
1. Timeframe is the year 2025–2030. 
2. All platforms within the system of systems are identical. 
3. Every node is a relay node (i.e., no sensors on board). 
4. Three DDGs comprise the surface action group (SAG). 
5. This SAG does not deploy the sensor nodes. 
6. Satellite communications is not available. 
7. GPS denied environment. 
8. System can gracefully degrade from full GPS to no GPS capability due to 
a local relative navigation system being available. 
9. Line-of-sight communications or data sharing is required. 
10. Military assets are in an offensive posture. 
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11. Emissions Control (EMCON) restrictions are in place. 
12. Vessels will be steaming in TACSIT-III, described as undetected and 
unlocated.by enemy vessels. 
13. The SAG will be augmented by: 
• one or more submarines (SSN). 
• the Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Nodes (TERN). 
• the Anti-submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned 
Vessel (ACTUV). 
• any other unmanned system that can carry the network 
• Note: This prevents further constraining of the problem. The 
system of systems can communicate with any platform carrying 
the network. 
14. All DDGs in the SAG can carry Long Range Anti-ship Missile (LRASM). 
15. LRASM has an unclassified range of 500 NM. 
16. This scenario will only look at a maximum range shot (500NM). 
17. SSN, ACTUV, and other external capable platforms can perform the 
acoustic-to-radio frequency links  
18. Undersea assets must get signal to surface (in RF format) in order to 
communicate with the network. 
19. Unmanned vehicles have an autonomous navigation capability. 
20. All platforms are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). 
• SEA23 made this assumption because of current UAV 
capabilities to support cross-domain operations and because it 
allows for simpler logistics and maintenance efforts for the 
system. 
21. All UAVs are co-altitude at 2000 feet. 
D. TACTICAL DATALINK SELECTION 
The U.S. military currently have multiple tactical datalinks (TDL) in operation. 
CAPT Good, surface warfare subject matter expert, briefed SEA23 on the complexity and 
cost of integrating a new system into existing AEGIS architecture. Because of this and 
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the timeline constraint, SEA23 preferred an existing network that meets the system 
requirements. If a new (or new to the Navy) network is chosen, the integration challenges 
will be significant and it is preferred that an existing pathway such as Link-16 or 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) be used. CAPT Good stated that it costs 
roughly $350 million to break into the AEGIS mainframe and run new code. It is 
significantly cheaper if our system can use Link-16 or CEC, or their pathways, into the 
AEGIS mainframe to reduce cost and complexity. The following systems are potential 
solutions: 
• Link-16 
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
• Hawklink 
• Multifunction Advanced Digital Datalink (MADL) 
• Situational Awareness Datalink (SADL) 
• “AV” Digital Datalink (DDL) 
• “Elbit” Advanced Datalink (ADL) 
Research indicated that the platform physical size and weight is critical to the 
analysis. SEA23 wanted to determine basic network characteristics to perform a link 
margin analysis to determine range requirements on the networks. The characteristics 
SEA23 needs for each datalink are its physical size, weight, power requirements, 
frequency bands, data rates, range, and integration requirements. 
1. Link-16 
Link-16 originated as the Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs) with 
development beginning in the 1970s and IOC during the late 1980s. It is a widely used 
joint network installed on approximately 5000 platforms. The network operates on a 
timeslot architecture assigning participants a timeslot when the network “polls” them to 
push and receive their relevant data. The network can transmit either targeting 
information or voice (“J-voice”) communications. It uses frequency hopping for security 
(Akers 2014). 
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Major advantages of this network are that it is an existing architecture and it is 
widely used by the Navy. However, Link-16 has lower data rates that can cause issues in 
anti-air warfare (AAW) where the speed of threats requires quick responses. The current 
system has, roughly, a 26.8-1102 kbps data rate, which is sufficient for anti-surface 
operations but not anti-air (ViaSat 2015a). A Link-16 module weighs approximately 50 
lbs., can accept up to 350 Watts of power and operates in the 950–1250 MHz band. It has 
miniature forms and operates in the same band as the Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) 
system. Its physical size can be as small as 7.62 x 7.5 x 13.5 inches (ViaSat 2015a). 
2. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) development began in the late 1980s 
with refinements continuing through the 1990s. Most U.S. Navy ships now have CEC 
capabilities and rely on its integration with the Carrier Air Wing’s (CVW) E-2D 
Hawkeye. This system has a much higher data rate than Link-16, but comes at the cost of 
weight and size. Data rate numbers are classified, but estimates place CEC around 5 
Mbps in the 4–8 GHz range (Moore et al. 2002). CEC has three major components: Data 




Figure 20.  CEC Components. Source: Johns Hopkins (1995). 
Since the system needs only to relay information, it will only need the CEC’s 
Data Distribution System in order to function. Without a need to fuse sensor information 
or interpret the data in a relay node, significant weight reduction may be achievable. 
However, SEA23 was unable to find the current weight of the Data Distribution System. 
Therefore, an upper bound is the current airborne version of CEC onboard the E-2D. This 
is approximately 500 pounds and is approximately 2 x 2 x 3 feet (Johns Hopkins 1995). 
3. Hawklink 
Hawklink is a part of the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) linking 
U.S. Navy ships and MH-60 helicopters. Its specified range is up to 100 nautical miles, 
and it supports anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare. Because Hawklink only connects a 
single ship and helicopter, it is infeasible for this project (Janes 2016). It operates in the 
14.5-15.4 GHz band with an approximate data rate of 45 Mbps. Hawklink modules weigh 
just over 100 pounds and are approximately 8 x 15 x 23 inches.  
4. Multifunction Advanced Digital Datalink (MADL) 
Northrop Grumman developed the Multifunction Advanced Digital Datalink 
(MADL) to complement the Fifth Generation F-35 Lightning as its advanced network. It 
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provides a CEC-like capability while maintaining low observability using messaging 
formats similar to Link-16. MADL can support up to 25 terminals in a network and 
operates in the K-band. Because of its relative newness, its performance characteristics 
remain classified rendering it unfeasible for inclusion in this project (Akers 2014). 
However, SEA23 recommends that future work in this area include MADL as a strong 
alternative for use in cross-domain data exchange. 
5. Situational Awareness Datalink (SADL) 
Currently in operation onboard the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the A-10 Warthog is 
the Situational Awareness Datalink (SADL). Further developments allow for integration 
with Link-16 networks for data reception. Its weight is approximately 150 pounds and it 
operates in the same frequencies as Link 16. It has an approximate size of 13 x 23 x 35 
inches. However, it only has a data rate of about 256 kbps. The network is not a viable 
option due to low data rates and integration issues with Navy platforms (ViaSat 2015b). 
6. Other Networks 
SEA23 also looked at networks that are not currently U.S. military data links. 
Some are still in development resulting in fewer known specifics. After integration, they 
will not have any additional hardware because encryption, decryption, and language 
translation will only occur at the end users. This shows that lightweight networks can be 
useful in the project’s CONOPS with further development by 2025–2030. Choosing 
alternative networks creates integration issues outside the project’s scope. The 
architecture for integration will be relatively simple (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21.  Possible Integration Architecture for “Other” Network. 
As shown in Figure 21, only the end nodes that are outside the scope of this study 
will need to have additional hardware. The simplest way will be to make the data look as 
if it were Link-16 or CEC data so that a new pathway into the AEGIS mainframe will not 
be required. This is a very simplistic assessment and warrants further research but is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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7.  “AV” Digital Datalink (DDL) 
The Aerovironment (AV) Digital Datalink (DDL) is a small, lightweight network 
that provides video capability to the network. It uses an Internet protocol (IP) based 
network to provide interoperability between nodes. This network will require massive 
integration to be used in this context but if done can prove to be very useful. It is 
approximately 2x5x0.5 inches in size and weighs only 0.22 pounds. It supports a data rate 
of about 4.5 Mbps (Aerovironment 2015). 
8. “Elbit” Advanced Datalink (ADL) 
The Elbit systems Advanced Datalink (ADL) is an Israeli system currently used 
only in land warfare. It operates in the 1400–1600 MHz range with an option to operate 
in the 400–6000 MHz range. It also allows for a 1–9 Mbps data rate and is approximate 
5x4x3 inches in size with a weight of less than one pound. The system fits the scenario; 
however, there will be significant integration issues (Aerovironment 2015). 
E. LINK MARGIN ANALYSIS 
SEA23 granted further consideration to Link-16, CEC, and Other. The Other 
category represents a combination of DDL, ADL, and similar networks to ensure that all 
required data is available to execute a link margin analysis. This is to determine range 
more accurately using the project assumptions. The calculation does not take into account 
the horizon limitations as a function of antenna height. Table 8 shows all required factors 
in a link budget calculation. 
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Table 8.   Link Budget Calculation. Adapted from Harney (2013). 
 
 
SEA23 calculated the range of the communications system using an adaptation of 





T T T A R R
R






⋅     
 
Table 9 displays the data used in the above equation to calculate theoretical 
ranges as a function of system power and specifications. Most of these parameters are the 
same across the range of platforms. The two that vary across platforms are the data links’ 












Table 9.   Input Variables for Three Tactical Datalinks. 
Variable Link-16 CEC Other 
PT (Watts) 200 200 200 
GT  19.99 19.99 19.99 
LT 0.7 0.7 0.7 
LA 0.1 0.1 0.1 
LR 0.7 0.7 0.7 
GR 10 10 10 
λ (meters) 0.2727 0.4997 0.138157 
k (Joules/Kelvin) 3.18E-23 3.18E-23 3.18E-23 
T (Kelvin) 500 500 500 
B (Hertz) 4E+07 1E+09 1E+09 
F 2 2 2 
CNRR 2 2 2 
 
SEA23 chose 200 watts for the input power based upon the DOD’s Policy and 
Procedures for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, which outlines 
Link-16 certification requirements (DODINST 4650.01 2005). 200 watts is a reasonable 









Transmitter antenna gain of 13 dBi is appropriate for the scenario’s mesh 
geometry according to Cobham Antenna Systems (Cobham 2015). A transmission loss of 
approximately 0.7 is accurate due to cumulative design constraints. Atmospheric losses 
will be great in the South China Sea due to high humidity in the region and other 
obscurants (Harney 2013). Table 10 summarizes the theoretical ranges of the three 
systems. 
Table 10.   Results of Link Budget Calculations. 






F. TDL TRADEOFF ANALYSIS 
Table 11 summarizes the tactical datalinks’ physical characteristics. 
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Table 11.   Summary of Trade-off Parameters for Tactical Datalinks. 
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Table 12 summarizes the relevant parameters including the ranges calculated from 
the link margin for the chosen three options. 
Table 12.   Summary of Trade-off Parameters for Three Chosen Tactical 
Datalinks. 
Tradeoffs for Selected TDLs 








Physical Size 7.62 x 7.5 x 13.5 inches 
24 x 24 x 36 
inches 9 x 6 x 2 inches 
Weight 50 lbs. 500 lbs. 0.2 – 2 lbs. 
Power assumed 200 W 200 W 200 W 
Band 
L Band                C Band                  Various 
950-1250      
MHz 
4-8            
GHz 2-9           MHz 
Data Rate 26.8 - 1102   kbps 
5            
Mbps 4.5 – 9  Mbps 
Range 325 NM 119 NM 50 NM 
 
 
G. POWER REQUIREMENT WEIGHTS 
SEA23 assumed that the tactical datalink would use a separate power supply 
system from the rest of the unmanned vehicle that adds weight to the payload 
requirements. The CONOPS calls for an individual UAV eight-hour mission time; 
therefore, a battery life providing 200 watts of power will be required to operate for at 
least eight hours. This means that there will be a 1600 watt-hour (W-h) requirement for 
the battery. Lithium-Ion batteries have the remarkable characteristic of high energy 
density. A Lithium-Sulphur-Dioxide battery can provide up to 100 W-h per lb. of energy 
density. This means that an estimated weight of the battery will be about 16 pounds and 
added to the weights in Table 13 (Pisacane 2005). 
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H. PLATFORM SELECTION 
1. MQ-8B Fire Scout 
The MQ-8B Fire Scout (Figure 22) is a rotary wing unmanned aerial vehicle that 
is currently operational. It is fully autonomous and does not require a pilot for launch and 
recovery. It also has very few requirements for host ships and personnel. Currently, its 
total endurance is approximately eight hours and has a range of approximately 596 NM. 
However, it can only carry 300 pounds of payload, which is too low to carry CEC. 
Additionally, this UAV is large, measuring approximately 24 x 6 x 10 feet. The analysis 
found the UAV too large, not meeting system operational requirements, but it is included 
in the analysis because of its operational status. A more capable version, the MQ-8C, is 
also in use, but it is much larger and marginally smaller than an MH-60 Seahawk 
(Northrup Grumman 2015). 
 
Figure 22.  Sailors Operating an MQ-8B Fire Scout On-board a Ship. Source: 
Northrup Grumman (2015). 
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2. DP-5X Wasp 
Dragonfly Pictures, Incorporated (DPI) UAV Systems is developing the DP-5X 
Wasp (Figure 23). This system is a small rotary wing UAV. It can carry a 100-pound 
payload at 110 knots up to 15,000 feet. It is much smaller than the Fire Scout. While it 
cannot carry CEC, it can easily carry Link-16 and other lightweight networks. This 
system requires no launch or recovery equipment and is fully autonomous. Two people 
can deploy this system in 15 minutes or less depending on level of preparation. It is small 
enough to carry up to 15 per DDG hangar (DPI 2014a). 
 
Figure 23.  DP-5X Wasp in Flight. Source: DPI Systems (2014a). 
3. DP-14 Hawk 
Resembling a miniaturized Chinook helicopter, DPI UAV also produces the DP-
14 Hawk (Figure 24). It has a large cargo capability and can currently carry a payload of 
430 pounds. It is also fully autonomous and only takes one person to setup and deploy in 
about 15 minutes. Currently its endurance is only 2.4 hours at maximum payload; 
however, SEA23 expects that 10–15 years of research and development will increase its 
ability. Additionally, the company advertises that placing a “pusher prop” on it will 
increase range and payload. It is reasonable to assume that with technology increases on 
the range and payload capabilities, as well as the reduction in weight of CEC, that this 
system can carry a CEC Data Distribution System Node. 
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Figure 24.  A Worker Installs Rotors on the DP-14 Hawk. 
Source: DPI Systems (2014b). 
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VII. MODELING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS  
A. DETERMINE MINIMUM NUMBER OF NODES 
1. Methodology 
In determining the minimum number of nodes, SEA23 approached it as a fixed 
area problem. Figure 25 shows the geometry of the area of interest. The intent is to fill 
this area with UAVs so that a communication signal can reach from the far end back to 
the SAG. By filling the area with enough UAVs, there will be sufficient coverage for the 
entire area so that no dead zones occur anywhere within this half-circle. The team desired 
that these UAVs be evenly spaced and always within range of another UAV so that no 
signal can be lost. SEA23 will show all attempted methods in the order they occurred, 
even failed attempts, to illustrate the process that the team undertook. 
 
Figure 25.  Geometry of Area of Interest. 
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Given the fixed area, increasing the number of nodes will decrease range between 
nodes. Originally, SEA23 attempted to determine what range should be between the 
nodes given a fixed number of nodes, but the team found this to be the incorrect way to 
look at the problem. The better question to ask was given a certain maximum 
communication range of a node, how many will be required to fill the space? Because of 
the change in thinking, SEA23 discarded the previously produced General Algebraic 
Modeling System and Java models. That process did develop estimated requirements so 
that work can proceed for the simulation. An area-packing problem determined the 
minimum number of nodes. 
2. Horizon Limitations 
A major physical constraint of communications is the curvature of the earth. At 
the frequencies our networks operate in, there is very little refraction or bouncing that 
occurs that allows other types of frequencies (e.g., HF) to travel great distances. The 
assumption for this study is that if there is not line-of-sight communications, then the 
system cannot communicate with anything. The following equation shows the 
relationship between the distance of the transmission ( )TOTALL  and the height of the 
transmitter ( )TH  and receiver ( )RH . (Harney 2013) 
 ( )
1/2 1/2
TOTAL T R T RL L L A H H= + = +  
The term (A) is a constant. In this case, it is 1.229 for (H) to be in feet and the 
output will be in Nautical Miles. The maximum range equation simplifies because the 
UAVs are co-altitude. 
1/22TOTALL AH=  
Figure 26 shows the relationship between altitude and maximum range. 
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Figure 26.  Relationship of Altitude (feet) to Maximum Range (nautical miles) 
Assuming Co-altitude UAVs. 
The team made the initial assumption that all UAVs were co-altitude at 2000 feet. 
At this altitude, the maximum range for transmission is 110 nautical miles. This 
assumption enables a great range but also keeps the UAV low enough so that a surface 
platform will have to be within 55NM of the node to detect its transmission. However, 
after our initial runs of the model, the team determined that the number of nodes required 
at 2000 feet would be infeasible to operate. Therefore, the team looked at 5000 and 
10000 feet to analyze how many nodes will be required. 
3. General Algebraic Modeling System Methodology 
SEA23 first attempted to use the GAMS software that can compute linear, 
nonlinear, and mixed integer optimization problems (GAMS 2016). SEA23 first tried to 
approach this question using linear programming, but encountered two problems: 
1. Distance is not a linear function of placement, but a square root of squared 
numbers. Using Manhattan distances instead of Euclidean distances solves 
this problem. That will make it linear, and will throw us off by a factor of 
roughly 1.5 (Manhattan distance is always greater than Euclidean, so that 
will give us an upper bound). 
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2. The objective function considered the closest UAV to a given UAV. 
SEA23 numbered the UAVs from one to N. UAV number one was 
required to be within range of the SAG and each additional UAV had to be 
within range of at least one other UAV in the network. The minimum 
function is non-linear, and actually, not even convex, which will later 
cause modelling issues. 
SEA23 attempted to use nonlinear programming methods, but this meant that a 
global optimal solution might not be found or exist. The minimum function problem was 
still present, so the team used nonlinear programming with discontinuous derivatives. 
This method is discouraged, but it was tested. As expected, this method generated poor 
results, especially when trying to solve for a large number of UAVs. SEA23 needed a 
different approach.  
4. Java Model 
Java is a well-known computer programming language. Programming in Java 
provided some flexibility in building the model to the desired specifications. 
Evolutionary algorithms are good for giving a good solution, but possibly not the optimal 
solution (Ragsdale 2012). SEA23’s basic idea for an evolutionary algorithm is to: 
1. Create an initial population of random optional solutions, called the first 
generation. The team placed the UAVs randomly. Optional solutions are 
chromosomes. 
2. Rank the chromosomes. In this case, the rank is inverse to the maximum 
of all minimum ranges. The team must find the minimum for each UAV 
(required transmission range). SEA23 then selected the maximum, which 
is the transmission rate needed for this solution to work, as the number the 
program will attempt to minimize. This minimization will essentially find 
the most isolated UAV. In other words, the UAV that will have to transmit 
the furthest distance. A mathematical formula of this problem is given in 








<   
3. Creation of a new generation occurs after ranking the chromosomes. Each 
generation consists of 1000 chromosomes with each chromosome 
representing a possible solution. New generation creation occurs by taking 
 83 
the best of the last generation, some of them as is, some of them with 
“breeding,” i.e., taking two chromosomes, and creating a new one that is a 
mix of the two. This mixture was half of the UAVs from one solution and 
half from another. The other solution was a random choice from all other 
chromosomes in that generation. Breeding came by pairing UAVs from 
the two chromosomes, and the new one has a UAV in the middle between 
each pair. 
4. After “breeding,” random mutations to some of the chromosomes was 
done by picking a UAV in the chromosome, and placing it randomly 
somewhere else. 
5. The program continues creating generations, up to a predetermined 
number, in this case, 10000. 
There are problems with evolutionary algorithms. Primarily they are difficult to 
predict because of their embedded randomness. Because of this, SEA23 ran the program 
for a range of 1–50 UAVs, which resulted in a relatively smooth line, but with a few 
unexplained “bumps.” There are also parameters to decide on when using evolutionary 
algorithms, such as number of chromosomes in a generation, number of generations, 
“breeding” method and “mutation” method, and the fact that they are hard to predict 
makes it very hard to find the “right” parameters. This is a trial and error process and it is 
difficult to identify the soundness of an answer. Finally, evolutionary algorithms may 
take a long time to run. This program took 24 hours to run for 1–50 UAVs. The program 
achieved a relatively smooth curve to show a relationship of the range between nodes as 
the number of nodes increased. Figure 27 shows the relationship achieved with the Java 
model. The y-axis shows the range between nodes in nautical miles. Given a fixed area, 
the insertion of more UAV nodes means that the range between them will decrease. This 
is important in SEA23’s analysis because it shows whether there are sufficient nodes to 
support a specific communications network based on its range.  
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Figure 27.  Range between Nodes as a Relationship to the Number of Nodes in a 
Fixed Area. 
The curve is relatively smooth, but does have outliers because of the stochastic 
process of the evolutionary algorithm. A power curve fit the data well. Due to this 
essentially being a trigonometry problem, the team expected that it would be roughly a 
x−  function. The curve fit has a power of (-0.444), which is close to (-0.5). This data 
provided an initial estimate to begin later simulations. Additionally, while the geometry 
may be tough, the team anticipated attainment of a smooth curve. SEA23 decided that we 
asked the wrong question. Following feedback from the second IPR, the team decided 
that this was an overly complex method to determining the number of nodes required. A 
better way was to approach this as an area-packing problem instead of stochastically 
placing the nodes. Given that one of our assumptions is that the nodes are evenly 
distributed, this made more sense and provided a set number of nodes required based on 
range of the communications system and altitude. 
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5. Area Packing Problem 
SEA23 decided to re-approach the problem from a perspective of an area-packing 
problem based on feedback from the second progress review. Using a search theory 
scheme outlined in Professor Harney’s 2013 Combat Systems Engineering, there are 
two methods of packing circles: hexagonal and square. Each node can represent a circular 
search pattern since the antennas are omnidirectional. Figure 28 shows both hexagonal 
and square tiling. 
 
Figure 28.  Hexagonal and Square Tiling (Packing) Patterns. Source: Harney 
(2013). 
A cursory glance shows that hexagonal tiling offers the least amount of “white 
space” that is the area not covered. Because this is not a search problem, these nodes will 
be static for the purposes of the model. Therefore, there must be overlap so that the 
“white space” is nonexistent in order to ensure that the network can communicate 100 
percent of the time. While it is a geometry problem to determine the amount of overlap 
required to rid the area of uncovered space, it involves calculating several different 




Figure 29.  Geometry of Circular Overlap Problem. Source: Harney (2013). 
In Figure 29, (a) is the radius of the circle and (2d) will represent the distance 
between the circles. For this study, (2d), the radius of the circle, represents the maximum 
range of the communications system and the distance between nodes. The parameter that 
the team is interested in is what the distance between nodes needs to be in relation to the 
max range of the node. Harney (2013) defines this overlap parameter as /d aξ = . 
Through this relationship, the team determines how far apart the nodes can be for each 
network and how many will fill the area of operations. Consulting Figure 30 shows what 
this parameter needs to be in order to have complete overlap. 
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Figure 30.  Relationship of Overlap Parameter ( )ξ  to the Fractional Coverage ( )η  
and Coverage Efficiency ( )ε . Source: Harney (2013). 
Using Figure 30, it is determined that the fractional coverage is 1.00 with an 
overlap parameter of approximately 0.86. To determine the number of nodes required, the 
range of the communications node must be multiplied by 0.86. The area of operation is a 
half-circle with a radius of 500 nautical miles. The area of this shape is 392,699 square 
nautical miles. By dividing the total coverage area by the area covered by a single node, 
the total number of nodes required is determined. The area of a single node depends upon 
its maximum transmission range and is simply the area of a circle: 
 2rπ   
where (r) is the radius, or maximum transmission range of the individual node. Figure 31 
shows the results of these calculations. 
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Figure 31.  Minimum Number of Nodes Required to Cover Area Given the Range 
of the Communications Node. Note: X-Axis Does Not Start at Zero. 
The team discovered an error after running several trial models that drastically 
changed the project team’s calculations for the minimum number of nodes required. The 
project team had thought of these nodes as sensor nodes as in search theory instead of 
communications nodes. In a searching problem, too much overlap results in wasted 
coverage and time that assets could be looking for their target. However, this is a 
communications problem and overlap is required. This error led to an under-calculation 
of the minimum number of nodes required to fill the area. The communications signal 
must be able to reach another node. Therefore, the nodes can only be as far apart as their 
maximum range. From Figure 29, the parameter (d) must be equal to zero. The project 
team had incorrectly utilized the radius of the maximum range of a single node as the 
maximum distance between nodes. This means that there will be much more overlap than 




Figure 32.  Diagram Showing Required Overlap of Nodal Coverage to Complete 
Network. 
To model this overlap, the team performed another hexagonal area-packing 
problem. However, this time the team utilized half of the maximum range for a given 
TDL and assumed zero overlap. Since the nodes are communications nodes only and not 
searching for a target, overlap is not required. It is just required that the circles touch so 
that each circle modeled covers half the distance to the next node. Figure 33 shows how 
the models circles work in comparison to the physical range of the nodes. 
 
Figure 33.  Comparison of Real Node Distance (Blue Circles) to Modelled Circles 
(Red Circles) for Area Packing Problem. 
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Since there is no overlap in this updated packing model, the team needed to figure 
out what was the total area to cover. For hexagonal packing with zero overlap, the area 
covered is equal to 0.9069 of the total area. (Eagle 2013) Since the total area is 392, 699 
NM2, the area required to cover is: 
 2 2392699 0.9069 356139NM NM=   
SEA23 found the number of nodes by dividing the area required to cover by the 
area of a single node. Table 13 shows the results of the required number of nodes for each 
TDL considered. Additionally, both CEC and the Other network category reach their 
power limits at or prior to their horizon limits. Therefore, only Link-16 will show a 
benefit to increasing altitude as discussed earlier. 




B. SAG CAPACITY LIMITATIONS USING PLATFORM ANALYSIS  
The final physical constraint that the project team considered was how many UxV 
platforms can fit onto a SAG. The team considered an Arleigh Burke Class destroyer 
(DDG). This ship has two hangars and currently carries an MH-60 Seahawk in each one. 
The project team wanted to know how many of these UAVs could fit into the space of 
one helicopter. The MH-60’s folded length, width, and height are approximately 41 x 11 
x 13 feet. None of the UAVs considered are taller than 13 feet. The team only concerned 
the 41 x 11 feet of horizontal deck space and disregarded stacking for practical purposes 
(Lockheed 2001). 
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This is a much simpler packing problem than figuring out how many nodes can fit 
into the area because there is no overlap. The only necessity was to determine the two-
dimensional size of each UAV and divide the total area of the MH-60 by the area of that 
UAV. After finding the maximum number for each hangar, it is simple to determine how 
many can fit in a SAG. The team wanted to keep an MH-60 on each DDG (in order to 
fulfill other mission roles that the UAV was not suited for), but not all combinations may 
allow that. Where possible, the team used only one hangar for the UAVs on each DDG in 
order to keep the manned helicopter asset available. Additionally, based on the reliability, 
availability, and maintainability simulation, the number of required nodes to keep the 
number of functioning nodes above the minimum number may necessitate giving up the 
manned helicopter to provide room for the UAV. Table 15 shows these UAV capacity 
analysis results. 
C. RESULTS OF PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS 
After applying the various physical constraints, Table 14 shows the results of 
















The biggest takeaway from this table is that CEC currently does not have a 
platform that fully meets the requirement of being able to carry it. However, the DP-14 
Hawk is close and developments may enable it to increase its payload over the next 10–
15 years prompting further inclusion. Additionally, the 10–15 year time span may allow 
the physical lightening of CEC. However, the MQ-8B Fire Scout is not close to meeting 
requirements and too few platforms will fit in the SAG to accomplish the mission based 
on its size. The DP-5X Wasp can accomplish the mission and each DDG hangar is 
capable of holding 15 UAVs. The team dismissed “Other Networks” since it does not 
meet the required number of nodes. The maximum range of a UAV is affected both by 
the power output of the node and the horizon limitations as a function of altitude, 
summarized in the equation: 
 [ ]( ), ( )Max Range Minimum Range Power Range Altitude=  
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For both Link-16 and CEC, the SAG barely meets the required nodes before 
accounting for mission life cycle, reliability, availability, and maintainability. However, 
the minimum number of nodes represents the absolute minimum to keep the network 100 
percent functional. After studying the data in Table 15, the team determined that Link-16 
was the only viable candidate to continue studying. CEC will be incapable since its 
maximum transmission range is 119 NM. While an increase in platform altitude will 
decrease the minimum number of nodes required, CEC is already at its maximum range 
at 2000 feet. Any altitude increase will have negligible effects since it only has nine more 
miles of range than allowed at that altitude. Therefore, the team will study Link 16 
further through an ExtendSim model at 5000 and 10000 feet. Table 15 shows Link-16 
with its associated minimum number of nodes required at 2000, 5000, and 10000 feet. 
Table 15.   Link-16 minimum number of nodes required at given altitudes. 
 
 
D. RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY 
SIMULATION 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) are essential elements of 
mission capability. The reliability of the system is the probability that the system will 
perform under specified conditions for a given period. Availability of the system is a 
function of the frequency of failure, frequency maintenance activities, and the time it 
takes to complete the maintenance activities. System maintainability is its restorative 
ability, through maintenance actions, to a reach desired operational capability (DODINST 
4650.1 2005, 1-1). 
Reliability is important for the “Fire Web” system because the probability that a 
UAV will fail while in operation effects the system’s capability to perform its primary 
function of communicating and transmitting targeting data. Its simulation determines the 
effects a UAV failure will have on system performance. The availability of UAVs to 
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create the “Fire Web” system is important in ensuring the minimum numbers of required 
nodes to create the network are operating when needed. A simulation will assist in 
analyzing how the maximum UAV carrying capacity within a SAG effects the system’s 
ability to meet performance requirements. The maintainability of the UAVs directly 
affects the time it takes to relaunch a UAV. Maintenance actions can be built into a 
model and simulated to determine the effect that maintenance actions have on the UAVs 
operational availability to complete the “Fire Web” network. 
1. ExtendSim 
ExtendSim is a modeling and simulation software package by Imagine That!. It is 
used as a design tool to predict the performance of potential new systems (Imagine That! 
2016). SEA23 chose ExtendSim to model the availability of the “Fire Web” 
communications node system because it was a familiar tool taught and utilized in SE3250 
Capability Engineering. It also provided an easy interface to integrate the system OV-5b 
(Figure 14) into an accurate modeling and simulation program. 
The OV-5b was used to create the model because it specifically details the deploy, 
launch, operate, and recover cycle each UAV will be going through. The OV-5b 
identified critical inputs and outputs that were necessary for analyzing the results of the 
simulation. It facilitated the design of the reliability, availability, and maintainability 
model by illustrating the steps for each portion of the cycle. The OV-5b also helped with 
the evaluation of the approximate times each step will take because it used the lowest 
level functions. The OV-5b also illustrated the required input/output data needs for the 
system allowing identification of the critical information (capabilities) that the model will 
need to create an accurate prediction of system availability performance. 
2. Assumptions 
Assumptions were required for the system model because of either a lack of 
information or a classification barrier regarding different components, systems, or 
processes. We considered only UAV failures. We do not consider failure of equipment 
onboard the UAVs. We assumed that UAV failures only affect the time for maintenance 
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and repair once it returns to the ship; it does not affect flight time or time on station. The 
first assumption made for the model was the square footage of a DDG’s hanger. SEA23 
assumed that each DDG could fit one MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, its associated 
support equipment and personnel in one hanger bay (Lockheed Martin 2016). Therefore, 
the team determined the available footprint for the UAVs using an MH-60R’s footprint 
(including support equipment and personnel). 
SEA23 made many assumptions about UAV maintainability because of that 
information’s non-availability to the team. First, the team assumed that all maintenance 
actions and repair parts were organic to the SAG. This creates no delay in receiving parts 
from outside the SAG; in other words the logistics delay time (LDT) is essentially zero. 
Reduction of administrative delay time (ADT) occurs because only the maintenance 
personnel chain of command is involved in paperwork. Group operational experience and 
the SWARM analysis conducted for SE3302 System Suitability, was used in developing 
maintenance action times (Hanna 2015). SEA23 assumed that minimum maintenance 
actions are refueling and system check, taking only five minutes (refuel and system check 
occurring simultaneously) based on information provided by the manufacturer (DPI 
2016b). An average maintenance action will be refuel, system check, and replacement of 
a modular part, taking 15 minutes (refuel system and system check taking five minutes, 
replacement of part ten minutes). A long maintenance action will include refuel, system 
check, and repairs to fix a component, taking 360 minutes (refuel and system check 
taking five minutes, and component repairs taking the remaining time). 
 It was assumed that the UAVs, regardless of system type, will be capable of 
operating (total flight time from launch to recovery) eight hours and the SAG will be 
conducting a 72-hour operation. The UAVs will also be capable of carrying their 
specified TDL equipment. The team assumed that the maximum payloads for the UAVs 
would increase in the 10–15 year timeframe discussed in the project scenario (or 
conversely, payload weight will decrease). The UAVs can be launched in any weather 
condition the sensing platform is operating in, assuming the weather is similar between 
the sensing platform and SAG locations. The survivability and recoverability of launched 
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UAVs is 100 percent, assuming no losses due to enemy action or during the recovery 
process. 
3. Simulation Method 
In order to evaluate the system performance, a first order rough simulation was 
created using ExtendSim. Variability was added to the simulation using failure decisions 
for each UAV as it conducts its “deploy, launch, operate, recover” cycle. Triangular 
distributions for the maintenance downtime (MDT) and UAV travel/loiter times also 
added variability for each UAV. 
SEA23 used a triangular distribution for this simulation because it uses a 
maximum, minimum, and most likely value, creating a continuous probability 
distribution with a triangular shaped probability density function. This is useful when 
data for analysis is such that a mean and standard deviation cannot be attained (Petty and 
Dye 2013). 
4. Inputs 
The team based the ExtendSim model on the OV-5b (Figure 14). The ExtendSim 
model integrates the critical operational issues (COI) into a 72-hour SAG mission. UAV 
capacity for the SAG, system maintainability, reliability, UAV movement, and UAV 
loitering times are integrated together to simulate the effectiveness and availability of the 
UAV communications system with the SAG (Figure 34). 
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Figure 34.  ExtendSim Model Simulating the Number of Operational Nodes 
Based on UAV type, TDL type, MDT, and Failure Rate. 
Figure 35 depicts the deploy phase of the “deploy, launch, operate, recover” 
cycle. It begins with the input of UAVs carried by each ship in the SAG and ends with a 
weather decision. SEA23 based UAV input on the number of UAVs from the analysis of 




Figure 35.  Deploy Phase Of The ExtendSim Model Depicting Sag Carrying 
Capacity, Maintenance, Pre-Flight Check, And Weather Check. 
There are three strings, one for each SAG ship, for the deployment phase. The 
UAVs are in a queue prior to the pre-flight check. The pre-flight check activity takes five 
minutes and only allows one UAV to perform the activity on each ship. UAV reliability 
determined whether the pre-flight check was good or bad. Historical Predator UAV 
failure rates provide the pre-flight check results. SEA23 used the Predator as a basis for 
the failure rates. The team assumes that any UAV system used for the communication has 
10 to 15 years of operational time, which is similar to the Predator. According to a 2012 
article by the American Security Project, Predator failure rates were 7.6 per 100,000 
flight hours (Boyle 2012), or  hourfailures000076.0=λ . Using equation 12.5 from 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), the reliability of the UAV over a 72-hour period will be: 
 




This reliability means that there is a 99.5 percent chance a pre-flight check is 
good and a 0.5 percent chance it is bad. A failed pre-flight check requires the UAV to get 
maintenance. The maintenance activity holds an unlimited number of UAVs and 
immediately services each UAV as it enters the queue. This reliability means that there is 
a 99.5percent chance a pre-flight check is good and a 0.5percent chance it is bad. A failed 
pre-flight check requires the UAV to get maintenance. The maintenance activity holds an 
unlimited number of UAVs and immediately services each UAV as it enters the 
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maintenance activity block. We assume there is unlimited manpower/materiel for 
maintenance. A triangular distribution simulates maintenance downtime (MDT). Ship 
personnel conduct maintenance after each successful UAV recovery. SEA23 used the 
triangular distribution to “lean” the results towards the minimum and average 
maintenance times, while still considering that some UAVs will require a long 
maintenance action at some point during the 72-hour operation. A good pre-flight check 
results in the UAV going through a weather check decision. The scenario assumes a good 
weather check. A successful weather check moves the UAV to the launch phase of cycle, 
while an unsuccessful check results in the UAV going back the “ready” pool. 
Figure 36 depicts the launch phase of the deploy, launch, operate, recover cycle. 
This phase is simply the launch of a single UAV from each SAG ship. Since the 
successful weather check is always successful, all UAVs enter a single item queue where 
they are “launched” to either a far, middle, or close node. The optimal flow of UAVs to 
the far, middle, and close destinations was difficult to model using ExtendSim. This 
difficulty resulted in a simplification of the launch sequence that limits its ability to 
allocate more than three UAVs to each far, middle, or close destination, for the first 
cycle. The model prioritizes UAV destination based on far destinations first, followed by 
the middle and close destinations, respectively.  
 
Figure 36.  Launch Phase of the ExtendSim Model Depicting Single UAV Launch 
per Ship and Destination Decision. 
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The next phase in the ExtendSim model is the operate phase. This phase splits the 
UAVs into destination strings (far, middle, close) (Figure 37). 
 
Figure 37.  Operate Phase of the ExtendSim Model Depicting Far, Middle, and 
Close Node Strings Each With “Fly-To” Time, Failure/Shot Decision, 
Loiter Time, “Fly-From” Time, and Recovery Decision. 
An activity that “delays” the UAV from entering the “fly-to” activity simulated 
constant coverage at each node point. The expected launch cycle for each UAV traveling 
to the far, middle, or close destinations forms the basis for the “delay” activity. Assuming 
each “string” of far, middle, or close nodes is equidistant from the SAG, the “delay” was 
calculated by subtracting the “fly-to” time from sum of the “loiter” and “fly-from” time 
for each node distance. The “delay” activity has a built in trigger that signals it to “delay” 
UAVs once five UAVs have entered the “fly-to” activity. It also triggers the activity 
capacity to switch to zero, stopping launches of UAVs to that node position based on 
backlog in the “fly-to” activity. Figure 38 describes the ExtendSim statement that triggers 
the delay and Figure 39 describes the statement that triggers a stop. 
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Figure 38.  ExtendSim Statement That Triggers a Delay of UAVs in order to Stagger 
Arrival Time On-Station for the Wasp UAVs Being Sent to the Far Nodes. 
 
Figure 39.  ExtendSim Statement That Triggers a Stop of UAVs Being Sent to the 
Far Node String. 
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Table 15 shows the resulting “halt” times. A flaw in the “halt” activity is that it 
does not know when the first backlog is going to occur in the “fly-to” activity. It is only 
capable of knowing that a backlog is occurring resulting in too many UAVs sent to the 
“fly-to” activity, possibly creating a backlog in some simulations. 
The movement of the UAVs uses a triangular distribution based on the time it 
takes a specific UAV to move to the closest, middle, and farthest node. Travel time 
evaluation, based on TDL types, used maximum and cruise speed of each UAV type and 
distance to each node position. In order to remain consistent on each UAVs remaining 
operational time, the model adds a “fly-to” attribute value to each UAV. This attribute 
value is equal to the value given by the triangular distribution and is carried through the 
“loitering” and “fly-from” activities. For example, if a UAV is randomly assigned a three 
hour “fly-to” time, based on the triangular distribution, it will have a two hour “loitering” 
time and a two hour “fly-from” time. Figure 40 illustrates the equations used to distribute 
the random “fly-to” times. 
 
Figure 40.  ExtendSim Equations That Assign “Fly-To” Time Attributes to Each 
UAV. 
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Table 16 shows the travel and time on station for each UAV, TDL combination, 
and altitude, while moving at maximum speed. For example, the maximum speed of a 
DP-5X Wasp is 120 knots (DPI 2016a). The max distance between nodes for Wasp 














for the Wasp to get to its middle position, 250Nm being the center of the “moving deadly 





95500)( =−=  
with 500 NM being the location of the sensor and 95Nm being the max distance Link-16 
can communicate with the sensor. These values confirm the results of the calculations 
used in assigning the “fly-to” attribute time to each UAV. 
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Table 16.   Altitude, Travel Time, Time on Station, and Launch Frequency Values for Each UAV and TDL Combination. 
 
 
Smallest Type of UAV DP-5X Wasp DP-5X Wasp DP-5X Wasp (no helos) DP-5X Wasp (no helos) DP-5X Wasp (no helos) DP-14 Hawk (no helos) MQ-8B Fire Scout
Altitude (ft) 5000 10000 2000 5000 10000 2000 2000
Travel Distance (Nm)
   Close 21.4 237.4 170.2 21.4 237.4 170.2 170.2
   Medium 152.4 8.4 280.1 152.4 8.4 280.1 280.1
   Far 326.2 254.2 390.1 326.2 254.2 390.1 390.1
Speed, max (knots) 120 120 120 120 120 105 85
   Close Travel Time 0.2 N/A 1 1.5 2.1 1.1 1.3
   Medium Travel Time 1.3 0.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 3
   Far Travel Time 2.8 2.2 3.3 2.8 2.2 3.8 4.6
Operating Time* (hrs) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
   Close Time on Station 7.6 N/A 6 5 3.8 5.8 5.4
   Medium Time on Station 5.4 7.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.2 2
   Far Time on Station 2.4 3.6 1.4 2.4 3.6 0.4 -1.2
Launch Frequency* (hrs)
   Close Delay 7.4 N/A 5.0 3.6 2.4 4.7 4.1
   Medium Delay 4.1 7.7 1.7 1.9 2.4 0.8 1.0
   Far Delay 2.5 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
Link-16 CEC
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SEA23 based the operating times at each location on the time remaining after 
travel time to and from the UAV’s loitering location. The far time on station for the MQ-
8B Fire Scout is 1.6 hours, which signifies the Fire Scout’s inability to achieve the “Fire 
Web” communications network. This is mainly due to the slow speed and operating time 
of the Fire Scout. The operate phase utilizes a selector that integrates the probability of 
failure and survival into the model. SEA23 did not considered the failure rates based on 
the reliability used for the pre-flight check and the survivability of the UAVs, but they are 
easily introduced into the model to analyze the effects enemy actions can have on the 
availability of operational nodes. The operate phase ends with the UAV finishing its 
“time-from” activity. Each UAV then goes through a decision on whether the UAV can 
be recovered or not, and then sequentially being sent to Ship 1, 2, or 3 for recovery. The 
team also did not consider, at this time, the effects a recovery failure has on the 
availability of UAV nodes.  
Recovery phase simulation occurs last in the ExtendSim model (Figure 41). This 
phase consists of each assigned UAV arriving at their designated ship to be “recovered.” 
SEA23 assumes that recovery of a UAV will take five minutes based on the ease of 
landing for a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAV and subsequent movement into a 
hanger bay. The recovered UAVs return to maintenance, to be sent through the deploy, 
launch, operate, recover cycle again. 
 




The outputs of the ExtendSim model are a discrete event plotter and “lost” UAV 
exit (Figure 42). The discrete event plotter shows the average number of UAVs on-station 
and the average over 30 replications number of UAVs in maintenance at any time during 
a 72-hour SAG mission. This data determines if the minimum average number of UAVs 
on-station exceeds the minimum number of nodes needed to create the “Fire Web” 
(Figure 43). It is also useful in analyzing the effects sustained operations have on the 
maintenance for the UAV fleet. The “lost” UAV exit shows the total number of UAVs 
that failed (this simulation is assuming no UAVs are shot down; all UAVs are recovered 
and all flight times and times on station are completed). We are assuming that UAV 
failures only affect the maintenance repair time on the ship. This determines the impact 
reliability and survivability have on availability. The team also analyzed the effects of a 
failed recovery using this value. 
  
Figure 42.  Outputs of the ExtendSim Model: Discrete Event Plotter and “Lost” 
UAVs. 
“Lost” UAV Exit 
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Figure 43.  Discrete Event Plotter Results for a Link-16 Equipped DP-5X Wasp 
and SAG with Organic MH-60R Seahawk Helicopters (Average). 
6. Results 
From Table 14, 38 nodes were required to maintain the network at full capacity if 
the nodes operated at 2000 feet. It was easy to see that with any reliability, availability, 
and maintainability issues, the network cannot function at that altitude with only 45 or 48 
nodes. Therefore, the team did not look at the capabilities of the SAG with the manned 
helicopter for that CONOPS. However, even without the manned helicopter and using 96 
Hawks with CEC, it is impossible to achieve the minimum required nodes to operate the 
network as shown in Figure 44. Figure 44 displays an average of 30 simulations. Due to 
the stochastic nature of this simulation, no two simulations will result in the exact same 
graph. The blue line represents the operational nodes. SEA23 defines an operational node 
as a UAV that is on station. Even though these UAVs are “operational” from the moment 
they are turned on, the team does not consider them operational for the study until they 
are on station. The red dots represent the average number of UAVs in maintenance at any 
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given time. Additionally, the purple and blue dot-dash lines represent the upper and lower 
95 percent confidence interval for the average number of operational UAVs. The green 
dashed line represents the minimum required operational nodes for the network to be 100 
percent functional. A major point to realize is that the average number of operational 
UAVs and the average number of UAVs in maintenance do not add up to the total 
number of UAVs. There can be over five UAVs transiting to replace just one UAV and 
several transiting home after their mission. Therefore, none of the figures in the section 
represents the total number. 
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Figure 44.  The 96 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying CEC at 2000 Feet Altitude.
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Since CEC’s maximum range is 119 nautical miles, an increase in its altitude 
gains only 9 nautical miles of range. Without further research, CEC is not a viable 
consideration. Additionally, the team looked at Link-16 operating at 2000 feet with 90 
UAVs available in the SAG. The team also analyzed Link-16 operating at 2000 feet with 
90 UAVs available in the SAG. This was not a viable alternative due to the number of 
nodes required to transit long distances. It is impossible to meet the required number of 
nodes because many will begin maintenance early and limited launch platforms do not 
enable replacements quickly enough to cover the transit distance. Figure 45 shows that 
the Wasp and Link-16 combination does not work at 2000 feet. 
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Figure 45.  The 90 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying Link-16 at 2000 Feet Altitude. 
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At 5000 feet, the number of required nodes decreases to 16. However, these are 
also unachievable by both the 45 node and 90 node configurations of Wasps with Link-
16. This is because of the number of nodes still required to be airborne at a single time in 
order to fill a particular slot and limited launch platforms to refill them. In this 
simulation, there are still considerable distances that the UAVs must travel even if they 
are benefiting from better on-station times. This increased distance, and its associated 
failure rates, means that many UAVs must be transiting at any given time to replace those 
on station. A large number of these UAVs are not operational either in the simulation’s 
definition, but are flying to relieve an on station UAV or in transit home. Figures 46 and 
47 illustrate this capability gap. 
A simulation at 10000 feet showed much better results than the previous 
simulations. An alternative exists to use DP-5X Wasps equipped with Link-16 that will 
also achieve a completed network. The team first looked at 45 nodes available in the 
SAG (Figure 48). 
 113 
 
Figure 46.   Average of 45 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying Link-16 at 5000 Feet Altitude. 
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Figure 47.  The 90 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying Link-16 at 5000 Feet Altitude. 
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Figure 48.  The 45 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying Link-16 at 10000 Feet Altitude. 
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During the 5000 feet simulations (Figures 46 and 47), the number of nodes 
airborne is higher than in the 10000 foot simulation (Figure 48). By design, the 
simulation concept of operations is much different. In the 2000 and 5000 foot 
simulations, the node placement was essentially designed as having a close, middle, and 
far ring (referenced to the SAG). This meant that several UAVs did not have to travel 
great distances and were easy to keep operational. When the simulation increased to 
10000 feet, the nodes (on average) are required to travel greater distances than in the 
previous simulations. The model was not able to take advantage of having close nodes to 
fill. The previous simulations also have more nodes that are close to the ship increasing 
the ship’s ability to launch and replace them. In this simulation, all of the nodes must 
travel at least 200 nautical miles therefore the model experiences greater losses in the 
form of transit times. A SAG can achieve a 0.98 operational availability using 45 nodes. 
The minimum number of nodes required falls below the lower confidence limit for the 
average operational nodes indicating that there is a good chance the system will have the 
required number of nodes on average. However, there are few places where the network 
will drop below eight nodes. Therefore, even when the node is available in a 100 percent 
capacity, it will only experience a small coverage gap losing only one node. Proper 
tactical level planning will account for these gaps.  
In the 90-node configuration, the system can achieve a 0.97 operational 
availability for the 72-hour period. The SAG can continue launching nodes and even with 




Figure 49.  The 90 Hawks’ Operational Availability When Carrying Link-16 at 10000 Feet Altitude. 
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Figure 50.  Operational Availability of 90 Wasps Equipped with Link-16 at 10000 Feet with UAV Maintenance Removed. 
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The 10000-foot simulation with 90 UAVs available gave the best result. The 
worst-case scenario is an infrequent single node outage in coverage. The graph becomes 
difficult to read because of the number of UAVs in maintenance during this simulation 
resulting in a skew that makes the operational nodes difficult to identify. Figure 50 
depicts the same simulation with maintenance removed to enhance readability. In this 
simulation, the minimum number of nodes required is below the lower 95 percent 
confidence interval for the average operational nodes. This confirms the finding of a 0.98 
operational availability. 
There are noticeable dips in availability at least every 24 hours in both sets of the 
10000-foot simulation as seen in Figures 48, 49, and 50. This is associated with spikes in 
UAV maintenance as backlogs occur (although delayed). SEA23 wanted to investigate 
what the operational availability will be for the first 24 hours. The team wanted to test a 
system to its limits but a 24-hour scenario is also possible. The operational availability 
for a 24-hour and 45-node scenario is 0.97, showing a slight drop from the initial result. 
The same period for the 90-node scenario increases operational availability to 1.0 
showing the effect those additional on-hand nodes has when the system is under stress for 
a longer period. 
7. Recommendations 
Based upon Table 13, the “Other” network comprised of lightweight, low-power 
networks is not yet feasible, but requires further research. The UAVs considered are very 
small for their relative capabilities and there is no way to fit enough in a three (or four) 
ship SAG. The 10000-foot DP-5X Wasp with Link-16 option showed that it was feasible 
to retain the manned helicopter capability and meet the system of systems requirements. 
There are three basic alternatives from this study: 
1. Add additional ships to the SAG to fly lower altitude missions 
2. Choose to implement 45 DP-5X Wasps with Link-16, retaining the 
manned MH-60 capability 
3. Choose to implement 90 DP-5X Wasps with Link-16 and add additional 
ships to retain manned MH-60 capability 
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Any further study of Option 1 should include different combinations of ships. For 
a solution that is feasible to study and implement in the next 10–15 years, SEA23 
recommends option two. Since Options 2 and 3 provide roughly the same availability, the 
capability advantages by retaining the manned helicopter are superior to the buffer that 
having double the amount of UAVs will provide. However, a cost analysis must verify 
this recommendation. 
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VIII. COST ESTIMATION  
To determine the feasibility of the recommended design solution for the proposed 
SOS, cost estimation is necessary. In addition to technical requirements of a system, the 
acquisition plan for procuring the system is of the utmost importance. For the proposed 
design recommendation, SEA23 conducted a cost analysis that provides an estimate for 
the DP-5X Wasp/Link-16 combination and a comparison of two SAG complement 
options. 
A. TACTICAL DATA NETWORK COST ESTIMATE 
The proposed design is comprised predominantly of a platform and the physical 
hardware for the chosen tactical data link. These two system components will generate an 
overall system cost estimate. The tactical data link in question is currently in use by the 
U.S. Navy. Given this, the published acquisition report, which contains the cost data for 
the system, is usable in the cost estimate for this selected design. The system that 
provides Link-16 capability is the Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint 
Tactical Radio System (PEO, IWS 2015a). Fig 51 shows the MIDS JTRS per unit cost 
from the SAR (PEO, IWS 2015a). 
 
Figure 51.  Unit Cost Report. Adapted from PEO IWS (2015a). 
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Figure 51 shows the average procurement cost for a single unit in FY03$ as 
$243,000 and a 2014 SAR estimate of $258,000. Figure 52 shows the average annual 
operating and support cost for the MIDS in FY03$K that gives an estimate of 
approximately $10,240 per year (PEO, IWS 2015a). Combined, the purchase price and 
one year of operating support yield an approximate cost of $268,240 FY13 (PEO, IWS 
2015a). 
 
Figure 52.  Annual Operating and Support Costs. Adapted from PEO, IWS 
(2015a). 
Figures 53 and 54 show a visual comparison of the two along with a 20-year total 
procurement/operating and support cost for a single system. A cost comparison in FY16 
dollars provides a more accurate comparison. SEA23 used the Joint Inflation Calculator 
created by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis for cost conversions. SEA23 used the 




Figure 53.  Single-Year Cost Comparison in Fiscal Year 2016 Dollars. 
 
 
Figure 54.  20-Year Total Cost including Procurement and Operating and Support 
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Figure 54 shows the cost breakdown of procurement and operation and 
maintenance for a single year. Projections for a 20-year life cycle of the system show a 
steady increase. Compared to similar systems, the cost of a single system over a 20-year 
life is relatively affordable. 
B. UAV COMPONENT COST COMPARISON 
The second element of the proposed design is the platform. As previously 
discussed, platform selection was based on size and requirements. The DP-5X Wasp 
allows for a large number of units to be carried onboard a single ship. The manufacturer 
for this system is Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. located in Essington, Pennsylvania. Cost 
information for large production quantities is currently unavailable; however, the 
manufacturer provided assistance in estimating an approximate range for these costs. 
SEA23 and the manufacturer agreed that the UAS Roadmap 2005 was the best 
estimate for a single production cost. The UAS Roadmap states that the “empty weight 
cost” estimate is a commonly used metric that is standard in the aviation industry (OSD 
2005). It states that an approximation of these units will cost roughly $1500 per pound of 
empty weight and $8,000 per pound of payload capacity (OSD 2005). The payload 
weight concurs with the previous data obtained from the selected acquisition report for 
the MIDS JTRS. Using this metric for empty platform weight, a projected cost for the 
Wasp, as estimated by the manufacturer is approximately $550,000 to $750,000. 
Although these figures are rough estimates provided by the manufacturer, the 
projected ranges are well under the actual costs for most other comparable UAV systems 
currently employed within the DOD. Considering the platform will need to be purchased 
in a large quantity (at least units per SAG), the cost per unit will decrease given the large 
quantity being mass-produced. The manufacturer concluded that large-scale production 
reduces the cost per unit by approximately one half. This will result in a price range for 
each UAV to be $275,000 to $375,000. 
The manufacturer previously conducted a cost analysis on a similar and 
comparable UAV. This cost analysis included production cost drivers, reserve per hour 
costs, and direct operating costs per hour. Figure 55 shows the estimated costs. An item 
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of note is that the listed fixed annual cost regarding liability insurance and hull insurance 
applies to a non-government operated vehicle leading to their omission in the analogous 
cost estimate. 
Because SEA23 calculated the platform production cost separately, it is important 
to note that the cost estimation does concur with the cost estimation of a single unit as 
shown in the figure below. The data of significance is the cost of operation per hour. 
Excluding the fixed cost, the total operating cost per hour is approximately $280 (Figure 
55). Total yearly operating time is difficult to predict and is heavily dependent on the 
number of deployed units. Based on the developed concept of operations, SEA23 used a 
72-hour operation as the basis for the cost estimate. 
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Figure 55.  Estimated Operating and Support Costs in Fiscal Year 206 Dollars. 
A SAG can carry 45 or 90 nodes based on available storage space. Given the 
selected operating altitude of 10,000 feet, the number of nodes that need to be operational 
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to maintain network coverage over a 72-hour mission varies. Table 17 shows a 
comparison of the two feasible options based on operational availability and the resulting 
required number of nodes. 
Table 17.   72-Hour Continuous Coverage Mission Cost Estimate 
 
 
Table 17 highlights the main tradeoff analysis concerned in equipping a SAG with 
this system. These two combinations of operating altitude and instantaneous number of 
nodes in the air produce an operational availability and a cost to achieve it. An obvious 
conclusion is that equipping the SAG with 90 units instead of 45 units costs twice as 
much initially when procuring the nodes. Price increases when going from 45 to 90 
project to be less than the average cost of a single manned helicopter asset. As shown, the 
operational costs for a single 72 hour mission almost double while the operational 
availability is roughly the same. Due to the stochastic nature of the simulation, SEA23 
treated 0.97 and 0.98 to be statistically the same. This may not show an actual loss in 
performance for the 90 UAV simulation. There is no cost benefit given the fact that 
availability does not change, when compared to the loss in capability of removing a 
manned helicopter asset from the SAG. 
It is important to remember that the operational availabilities shown are slightly 
misleading because they guarantee complete network coverage. If there is a coverage gap 
in the network at any given time, even if less than 0.5% of the geographic area, the model 
reports no availability. The availability of the network is much higher than these reported 































10k 45 $14,625,000 0.98 8 7.84 564.48 $158,054
10k 90 $29,250,000 0.97 8 7.76 558.72 $156,442
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Another data point to consider is the choice of the 72-hour mission to model the 
operational availability of the system. Given the conditions the SAG will be operating in, 
it is possible that the actual operational window for the desired mission is actually less 
than 72 hours. As an example, SEA23 modeled an operational window of 24 hours with 
the resulting operational availabilities for the 45 and 90 node complements of 0.97 and 
1.0, respectively, which does not change the outcomes appreciably. The cost of the 1.0 
availability for a 24-hour mission is not worth the cost in capability by losing the manned 
helicopter. Based on this cost estimate and the operational availability of the two options, 
the recommendation is to equip each SAG with a 45 unit DP-5X Wasp and Link 16 
combination. This will give the SAG commander an acceptable operational availability 
for the SOS while maintaining a manned helicopter asset to complete other missions. 
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IX. RECOMMENDED FUTURE ANALYSIS  
SEA23 identified multiple areas during the project’s research for recommended 
future exploration. Because of scoping and the assumptions, however, promising ideas 
and possible additional avenues for exploration were truncated or not addressed in the 
final solution. These form the basis for future analysis recommendations.  
As distributed lethality continues to evolve and becomes an important and 
significant aspect of naval surface forces, the reliance and necessity for unmanned 
systems will continue to become readily important. Unmanned systems represent the next 
future force warfighting transition. Unmanned systems provide a relatively inexpensive 
and risk reduction approach towards conducting operations, particularly in A2AD 
environments. The following sections identify areas SEA23 saw as potential for 
additional research. The team identified these through the SE process and if more time 
were available, substantially greater insight into cross-domain solutions towards 
integrated fire control is possible. 
A. GREATER INSIGHT INTO UNDERSEA DOMAIN 
This project focused on surface and air technologies. SEA23 recommends that 
greater interaction occur with various undersea warfare stakeholders for input and 
integration of undersea components to the cross-domain architecture. Furthermore, 
engagement and involvement at the Submarine Technology Symposium (STS) might 
provide valuable insight into the interoperability of undersea-unmanned systems 
(http://www.jhuapl.edu/sts/Registration.aspx). Additional engagement will be beneficial 
with various stakeholders within the undersea warfare curriculum at NPS.  
The U.S. Navy is executing a significant amount of effort to create an undersea 
network system of systems. Using this framework and architecture, integrated into the 
SEA23 capstone provides a significant way-ahead with the full-scale cross-domain effort. 
With the ability to communicate and relay information in the undersea realm and 
undersea environment, the overall scale of information relay grows substantially. Greater 
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investigation for the integration of the undersea domain with the surface/air domains shall 
provide significant operational capabilities for forward deployed forces (Eckstein 2016b). 
In addition to exploring the wide range of possible avenues and platforms with 
undersea warfare, communication networks and communication relay paths provide a 
possible area for further research. Exploration and insight into the Acoustic-to-Radio 
Frequency linkage will be appropriate in relaying of above surface vs. below surface 
information. In particular, how does an undersea platform communicate and relay 
information to a surface or air platform? Investigation centered on the seamless transition 
in data relay between these domains will provide a significant enhancement to conducting 
operations in multiple domains. Two current projects fit this description: Tactical 
Undersea Network Architectures (TUNA) and Waveglider. TUNA seeks to provide an 
underwater fiber optic network with surface buoys acting as the subsurface to surface link 
(Klamp 2015). This will enable a long distance high bandwidth transmission line in the 
subsurface environment, which will be very difficult to detect except at the entry and exit 
buoys. Liquid Robotics, Incorporated is developing the robotic platform Waveglider. 
This system consists of an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle with a tethered 
acoustic package towed underneath. They have conducted extensive testing on this 
system and it provides a capability to relay undersea acoustic information to the surface 
or airborne platforms in the radio frequency spectrum (Liquid Robotics 2016). 
B. ENHANCEMENTS TO EFFECTIVENESS OF SOS WITH FUTURE 
DATA LINKS 
SEA23 examined only a few of the available data links based on interoperability 
and future interoperability with current naval platforms. Future integration and 
examination of data links might provide significant enhancements to the system of 
systems. With the ability for nodes to carry advanced systems, the overall structure of the 
system of systems gains greater operational effectiveness. Overall enhancements related 
to minimizing required power output, increasing UAV payload capacity, and decreasing 
data link hardware weight, such as increasing mission time, will enable the system of 
systems with the scenario to broaden and gain much greater levels of feasibility and 
capability. 
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C. ALTERING OR RE-ADJUSTING THE SCENARIO 
SEA23 focused on capabilities and constraints of a three DDG SAG. Follow-on 
research can focus on the trade space related to AFP with the integration of other 
platforms (LCS, CG, LPD, etc.). Understanding the various tradeoffs associated with 
AFP will provide a much greater insight into the operational capabilities that can exist 
with an extremely modular and versatile system of systems. Additionally, through the 
analysis of various AFP, altering the scenario and imposing different assumptions on the 
problem statement will steer or scope the project differently. Altering, removing, or 
adjusting SEA23’s assumptions in a follow-on research scenario might make the solution 
much more feasible or help identify areas for enhancements. 
D. DARPA INJECTS 
DARPA continues to lead the DOD on various innovative solutions for future 
operations. Increasing interaction and insight into DARPA projects will help feed into the 
various possibilities for future integration into the SEA23 system of systems. DARPA 
has developed numerous platforms, which could find use as forward-looking sensor 
platforms for integration. Greater interaction and integration of the DARPA projects are 
will occur during the course of their development. 
E. GREATER JOINT INTEGRATION 
This project is adaptable to a wide range of military operations. The predominant 
research and solution focused on rely of information in the maritime environment, but 
applications in other military domains exist. Each service has its own approach towards 
unmanned systems and unmanned systems integration. For example, integration of the 
USAF Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV will enable non-organic air 
assets to integrate into the organic system of systems to increase coverage, range, mission 
time, etc. A full-scale joint interoperability involving all services will seek to provide a 
fully networked and integrated solution for cross-domain operations. 
For purposes of enhancing tactical offensive operations, future research can focus 
on the integration of the USAF Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) to provide 
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significant levels of lethality. Using a stealth bomber and its offensive payloads will 
enhance naval strike capabilities by providing an avenue for integration between the 
system of systems and the LRS-B. “Smart weapon” systems integration 
One item that repeatedly arose when addressing operating in a DDIL environment 
was in-flight missile feedback and the ability for missiles to receive updates and targeting 
information while in flight. A possible solution to this constraint investigates the ability 
for the system of systems to provide this level of information and detail. This will require 
greater fidelity and speed of information relay through the node platforms. Greater 
insight into the feedback loop or feedback chain of an inflight missile will greatly 
enhance naval lethality inside the scenario by providing much greater clarity and 
precision to weapons engagement. 
F. PRECISION, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING (PNT) 
SEA23 assumed degrading GPS capabilities, but not its complete loss or denial 
through the project. Identifying this assumption proved that reliance on GPS for PNT 
represents a highly complex adjustment to current operations. The reliance on GPS for 
almost all military operations is a key vulnerability, particularly when operating in a 
DDIL environment. There are a variety of measures that can be implemented in 
overcoming this issue (Fixed triangulation for positioning, celestial navigation); however, 
the speed, accuracy, and ease of using GPS must be explored and augmented by possible 
other systems. The current backup to GPS is INS, which is accurate; however, requires 
weekly updates to ensure accuracy. For purposes of providing sensors and weapons with 
pinpoint accuracy, greater exploration needs to occur in overcoming this challenge and 
providing a solution for minimizing the reliance on GPS. 
G. QUICK-LAUNCH “CUBE-SATELLITES” 
Based on the assumption that reliance on satellites will be severely degraded, the 
idea of using Cube-Satellites provided an alternative means in this denied environment. 
The idea involved launching a satellite via the vertical launch system (VLS) on a ship or 
submarine. This will seek to provide sustained satellite operations in a contested 
environment to support operations. Providing this localized satellite coverage will assist 
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in overcoming the issues associated with PNT. Furthermore, localized satellite 
capabilities decrease the reliance on UAV platforms. Research can focus on the 
feasibility of Cube-Satellites and the potential EM vulnerabilities associated with 
operations. The focus can be aimed at overcoming the PNT issues, while simultaneously 
providing forward operating forces with the ability to update positioning information for 
possible offensive engagements (such as updating operating INS). 
H. CONVERSION OF CURRENT MANNED SYSTEMS TO UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS 
To provide increased levels of platform speed and capability, research can focus 
on utilizing the current force structure platforms and converting these to unmanned 
systems to operate in the DDIL environment. For example, the proposal to convert 
“moth-balled” aircraft (from the aircraft boneyard) into unmanned systems to provide 
additional coverage and greater levels of speed and range. Furthermore, conversion of C2 
platforms (E-2D Hawkeye) into unmanned systems will provide decreased risk to 
manned assets, while providing the current capabilities that are available to operating 
forces. Research exploration can focus on the full-scale cost effectiveness and cost 
analysis associated with system conversion and the applicability of these operating 
systems. 
I. DISPOSABLE OR NON-RECOVERABLE OPTIONS 
This project focused on organic, recoverable systems. Future analysis should ask 
if this is necessary or if a disposable, non-recoverable system will suffice. Research 
exploration can focus on the cost effectiveness of disposable systems and explore the 
various trade space associated with disposable systems. For example, if these disposable 
systems acted like sonobuoys, can they provide enhanced capabilities or will the structure 
of the force be limited to the duration of these operating systems? Future research will 
provide additional avenues into numerous possibilities for enhancing the solution and 
providing a more feasible approach. SEA23 focused on only a handful of current 
available platforms and systems; however, further exploration of additional commercial 
off-the-shelf or government off-the-shelf platforms might provide greater or enhanced 
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effectiveness. One possibility is the use of solar-powered UAVs that has Link-16 
capability. This would fulfill a long-range, long dwell time capability that current small 
rotary UAVs lack. 
J. NON REAL-TIME OPTIONS 
Difficult coverage areas prompt further research into non real-time options, as 
when a node detects a possible target, but does not have another relay node in range. The 
node will store its information, move to within line-of-sight of another node, and then 
transmit its information. While the real time capability will be lost in this scenario, this 
capability will ensure that the information itself is not lost. This requires research into 
storage capacity and modifications to the networks themselves. However, the project 
team thinks that this will be a worthwhile addition to the system of systems. 
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APPENDIX C: FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
T.1.1 “To Launch”: The function of ‘to launch’ provides the system with the 
ability to move the unmanned platform from its transit ship into the air, sea surface, or 
sea sub-surface. 
T.1.1.1 “To Check Weather”: Weather conditions must be less than the maximum 
launch threshold for the unmanned platform. 
T.1.1.1.1 “To Call Weather Service”: A weather-monitoring agency or office 
continuously updates current and future weather conditions. 
T.1.1.1.2 “To Decide Go/No Go”: The crew decides whether the weather supports 
launching the unmanned vehicle or if the mission must be delayed or cancelled due to, 
weather conditions exceeding the maximum launch threshold. 
T.1.1.2 “To Use Launch Equipment”: The launch equipment is the physical 
object(s) used to move the unmanned vehicle from its transit ship into the air, sea surface, 
or sea sub-surface. 
T.1.1.2.1 “To Perform PCC/PCI on Launch Equipment”: The crew checks the 
equipment for indications that it will not perform its primary function of launching the 
unmanned vehicle, prior to the unmanned vehicle’s launch. 
T.1.1.2.2 “To Store Launch Equipment”: The launch equipment must be stored 
while not in use. 
T.1.1.2.3 “To Set-up Launch Equipment”: The crew places the launch equipment 
in an operational state prior to launching an unmanned vehicle. 
T.1.2 “To Deploy”: The function of ‘to deploy’ provides the system with the 
ability to sustain, support, and transport unmanned platforms while in transit to and 
within the area of operations. 
T.1.2.1 “To Prepare”: The crew readies the unmanned system for use by 
considering the maintenance, preflight checks, and upload mission data. 
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T.1.2.1.1 “To Maintain”: The maintainability and availability of the unmanned 
systems. 
T.1.2.1.1.1 “To Conduct Maintenance”: Identifying and correcting issues with 
unmanned systems and their associated equipment. 
T.1.2.1.1.2 “To Keep Available”: The probability that unmanned systems will 
operate satisfactorily when called upon (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 441). 
T.1.2.1.2 “To Conduct PCC/PCI”: The pre-flight checks that will identify any 
potential issues with the unmanned systems and their associated equipment. 
T.1.2.1.3 “To Upload Data”: The unmanned system must understand its operating 
parameters for the mission it will perform. The crew uploads mission data into the 
unmanned system’s control system. 
T.1.2.1.3.1 “To Know Mission Plan”: The unmanned system must have 
information regarding its route and loitering time. 
T.1.2.1.3.2 “To Know Threats in Vicinity”: The unmanned system must identify 
threats nearby. 
T.1.2.1.3.3 “To Know What Data to Relay”: The unmanned system must have 
data encryption keys so that it knows whether a communication signal is authentic or not. 
T.1.2.1.3.4 “To Know Team Configuration”: The unmanned system must know 
where receiving nodes are spatially located in relation to its location for successful data 
transmission. 
T.1.2.2 “To Store”: The unmanned systems and their associated support 
equipment must be safely stored when not in use. 
T.1.2.2.1 “To Keep Safe”: The unmanned systems must be kept safe to avoid 
damage or compromise. 
T.1.2.2.2 “To Secure”: The unmanned systems must not be damaged while in 
storage. 
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T.1.2.2.3 “To Encrypt”: The unmanned systems must be secure from an 
adversary’s attempt to gain access to stored data. 
T.1.3 “To Operate”: The function of ‘to operate’ provides the system with the 
ability to perform its mission of communications relay from sensor to C2 and back to 
sensor. 
T.1.3.1 “To Navigate”: The unmanned systems must be able to know where it is 
located within the operational area and move to its area of operations from its launch 
point. 
T.1.3.1.1 “To Know Current Location”: The unmanned system’s ability to know 
its current location is necessary for it to navigate to its final loitering area of operation. 
T.1.3.1.1.1 “To Use Stars”: Celestial navigation is the use of the sun and stars to 
locate position. Mariners have used it for centuries (Celestial Navigation.net 2014)  
T.1.3.1.1.2 “To Use Triangulation”: Using the distance between two or more 
nodes in order to form a triangle and establish a nodes relative position to those points 
(Webster’s Dictionary 2016). 
T.1.3.1.1.3 “To Use a Map”: Software aboard unmanned platform will use 
relativity in relation to other platforms to distinguish positioning 
T.1.3.1.1.4 “To Recognize Terrain/Landmarks”: Associating terrain and land 
features with prior understanding of what the terrain and landmarks are supposed to be.   
T.1.3.1.1.5 “To Use Planets”: Unmanned system can use celestial bodies to 
navigate. 
T.1.3.1.1.6 “To Use Earth’s Magnetic Field”: Using the naturally occurring 
magnetic fields found on Earth to navigate. 
T.1.3.1.1.7 “To Use Echolocation”: Using reflected sound to determine location 
and navigate to waypoints. 
T.1.3.1.1.8 “To Use Dead Reckoning”: Use a predetermined trajectory, speed, and 
time to move through waypoints. 
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T.1.3.1.2 “To Move to a New Waypoint”: The ability to fly, float, walk to a 
predetermined position. 
T.1.3.1.2.1 “To Fly”: To move in or pass through the air using wings (Webster’s 
Dictionary 2016)  
T.1.3.1.2.2 “To Float”: Rest on the surface of or be suspended in a fluid 
(Webster’s Dictionary 2016) 
T.1.3.1.2.3 “To Walk”: To move with your legs at a speed that is slower than 
running (Webster’s Dictionary 2016). 
T.1.3.2 “To Relay Communication”: The relay of information consists of three 
steps: data reception, data processing, and data transmission. 
T.1.3.2.1 “To Transmit Data”: Communications data moves to another node using 
electromagnetic waves. The changing of the input signal as preparation for transmission, 
by adjusting the format of the waveform as required. The increase in the waveform signal 
strength as necessary and determined by losses in transmission medium. Propagate the 
prepared signal in the necessary medium by specific waveform (Harney 2013). 
T.1.3.2.2 “To Process Data”: The node receives communications data, which, 
after confirmation, becomes transmission data sent to a receiving node. Change of signal 
into an adequate waveform for transmission in medium. Determine errors in signal. 
Arrange data for specific encoding for transmission. Ex: on-off keying. Prepare input 
signal for transmission as output information/signal. Determining the data signal to time, 
phase, and channel (frequency). (Harney 2013) 
T.1.3.2.2.1 “To Turn Received Data into Transmit Data”: The process of 
receiving communication data and turning the data into a transmittable waveform. 
T.1.3.2.2.2 “To Confirm Message Source”: The message can be deception signal 
sent by an adversary. In order to prevent transmission of erroneous or deceptive messages 
from, it is necessary to confirm the source of the message. 
T.1.3.2.2.3 “To Determine Where the Message is Going”: The message requires a 
destination prior to sending it. 
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T.1.3.2.3 “To Receive Data”: The platform collects the data (specific signal 
frequency(ies)) that it uses or must re-transmit through a specified communication 
network (Harney 2013). 
T.1.3.2.3.1 “To Use Receive Antenna”: A receive antenna is necessary to collect 
the electromagnetic waves containing the communication data. 
T.1.3.2.3.2 “To Receive Noise”: Noise is erroneous electromagnetic interference 
that may be present in the atmosphere or node systems. 
T.1.3.3 “To Protect”: The unmanned systems must be kept safe from harm or loss 
by ensuring their flight altitude, airspeed, and loitering time falls within threshold values. 
T.1.3.3.1 “To Determine Flight Altitude”: The altitude at which a UAV must fly 
at according to mission parameters. 
T.1.3.3.2 “To Determine Airspeed”: The speed at which a UAV must fly at 
according to mission parameters. 
T.1.3.3.3 “To Determine Loitering Time”: The length of time an unmanned 
system can operate before power levels drop below a threshold and the unmanned system 
will fails prior to retrieval. 
T.1.4 “To Recover”: The function of ‘to recover’ provides the system with the 
ability to retrieve the unmanned platforms after mission completion. 
T.1.4.1 “To Check Suitability for Recovery”: The suitability of recovery for the 
unmanned system based on the status of the unmanned system and the weather. 
T.1.4.1.1 “To Check Remote Vehicle Status”: The status of the unmanned system 
is critical to its recoverability. It must be able to make it to its recovery point under its 
own power. 
T.1.4.1.2 “To Check Weather Conditions”: Weather conditions must meet or 
exceed the recovery threshold for the unmanned platform. 
T.1.4.2 “To Use Recovery System”: A recovery system is necessary for the 
successful retrieval of the unmanned system. It must be set-up when the unmanned 
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systems are in use and stored while they are not in use. It must be reliable so that the 
recovery system can perform its main function. 
T.1.4.2.1 “To Perform PCC/PCI on Recovery Equipment”: The pre-flight checks 
that will identify any potential issues with the recovery system. 
T.1.4.2.2 “To Store Recovery Equipment”: The recovery equipment must be 
stored while the unmanned system is not in operation. 
T.1.4.2.3 “To Set-up Recovery System”: The recovery equipment must be set-up 
before any recovery operations can occur. 
T.1.4.3 “To Acquire and Track Remote Vehicle”: The retrieving system must be 
able to know the status and location of the unmanned system. 
T.1.4.3.1 “To Correct Remote Vehicle”: The retrieving system needs to ensure the 
unmanned system is aware of the retrieving system’s ability to recover the unmanned 
system. 
T.1.4.3.1.1 “To Give Final Clearance for Recovery”: The unmanned system needs 
to know if the retrieving system is ready to recover the unmanned system. The retrieving 
system notifies the unmanned system that it is ready for its recovery. 
T.1.4.3.1.2 “To Abort and Re-attempt Recovery”: The unmanned system must be 
able to abort the recovery operation and re-attempt when the retrieval equipment is ready 
to recover the unmanned system. 
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APPENDIX D: CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES, MEASURES OF 
EFFECTIVENESS, MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE, AND DATA 
REQUIREMENTS 
• COI 1: Will the system of systems be an effective information relay?  
• MOE 1.1: Minimize relay time within the node platform 
• MOP 1.1.1: Time for input/output of relay signal shall be less than 
GOTS specification. 
• DR 1.1.1: Measure delay time signal transfer 
• MOP 1.1.2: Maintain zero processing on data transferring nodes 
• MOE 1.2: Communicate line-of-sight (LOS) between nodes  
• MOP 1.2.1: LOS range based on signal power  
• DR 1.2.1.1: Measure required power output (Watts)  
• MOP 1.2.2: LOS range based on altitude  
• DR 1.2.2.1: Determine optimal operating altitude  
• DR 1.2.2.2: Determine minimum operating altitude  
• MOP 1.2.3: LOS range based on environmental conditions 
• DR 1.2.3.1:  Determine atmospheric attenuation at operating frequency 
• DR 1.2.3.2: Determine cloud coverage 
• MOE 1.3: Area of Communication Relay Coverage  
• MOP 1.3.1: Footprint of battlespace no less than 500 NM in radius 
• DR 1.3.1.1: Measure transmission power level for adequate coverage 
within communication area 
• MOE 1.4: Operate using effective Tactical Data link/network 
• MOP 1.4.1: Link/Network to relay sensor data to prosecuting platform 
• DR 1.4.1.1: Measure data rate 
• DR 1.4.1.2: Measure required bandwidth 
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• DR 1.4.1.3: Measure network latency 
• DR 1.4.14: Measure Link Margin 
• MOP 1.4.2: Maintain Information Assurance 
• DR 1.4.2.1: Determine mode of encryption. 
• DR 1.4.2.2: Determine mode of user authentication  
• MOP 1.4.3: Maintain Anti-jam / jam resistant properties  
• DR 1.4.3.1 Determine susceptibility to jamming.    
• MOP 1.4.4: Suitable physical requirements  
• DR 1.4.4.1: Equipment weight/size/power requirements 
• DR 1.4.4.2: Compatibility with platforms 
• MOE 1.5: Data Reliability 
• MOP 1.5.1: Network supports topology requirements 
• DR 1.5.1.1: Minimum number of nodes required for information relay 
• DR 1.5.1.2: Measure of network resilience 
• MOP 1.5.2: Minimize bit error rate  
• COI 2: What defines the system-of-systems availability? 
• MOE 2.1: Maintainability 
• MOP 2.1.1: Maintain a minimal mean corrective maintenance time 
• DR 2.1.1.1: Airframe repair time for specific faults 
• DR 2.1.1.2: Propulsion replacement time  
• DR 2.1.1.3: Sensor replacement time 
• DR 2.1.1.4: Communication suite replacement time 
• DR 2.1.1.5: Mean preventive maintenance time 
• MOP 2.1.2: Maintain a minimal mean operational mission failure 
repair time  
• DR 2.1.2.1 Total hours of corrective time to restore failed nodes to 
mission capable status after an operational mission failure 
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• DR 2.1.2.2: Total number of operational mission failures 
• MOP 2.1.3: Maintain a minimal mean time to repair 
• DR 2.1.3.1 Sum total of corrective maintenance time 
• DR 2.1.3.2 Total number of corrective maintenance actions 
• MOP 2.1.4: Maintain a minimal mean time to restore node 
functionality 
• MOE 2.2: Operational Availability 
• MOP 2.2.1: Meets or exceeds desired operational availability. 
• MOE 2.3: Maneuverability 
• MOP 2.3.1: Speed 
• DR 2.3.1.1: Max speed 
• DR 2.3.1.2:  Average speed given operational scenario 
• DR 2.3.1.3: Max climb speed to required altitudes 
• MOP 2.3.2: Altitude  
• DR 2.3.2.1:  Max altitude before performance degradation 
• MOP 2.3.3: Range  
• DR 2.3.3.1: Maximum operational radius on single load of power 
• DR 2.3.3.2: Mean operational radius of different sensor load 
• MOP 2.3.4: Endurance  
• MOP 2.3.5: Station Keeping  
• MOE 2.4: Reliability [duration of failure free performance on mission] 
• MOP 2.4.1: Minimum number of nodes required to maintain physical 
network  
• MOP 2.4.2: Mean time for nodes to conduct self-patching of mesh 
network in event of particular nodes losing signal 
• MOP 2.4.3 Mean time between operational mission failure 
• DR: Operating time 
 152 
• DR: Number of operational mission failures 
• MOP 2.4.4: Operation in foul weather 
• COI 3: What are the system of system’s capabilities for 
interoperability?  
• MOE 3.1: Is the system capable of interoperating with proposed 
network of systems 
• MOP 3.1.1: Network must be fully interoperable with existing C2 
systems 
• MOP 3.1.2: Network must maintain a maximum sustainable 
throughput equal to existing C2 systems 
• DR 3.1.2.1: What is the system bit error rate at maximum operating 
range? 
• DR 3.1.2.2: What is the system bit error rate at nominal operating 
range? 
• DR 3.1.2.3: What is the degradation level in moderate to adverse 
weather conditions? 
• COI 4: Will the system of systems be survivable in operations? 
• MOE 4.1:  Is the UAV survivable? 
• MOP 4.1.1. What are the probabilities of detection and tracking of the 
UAV in the Area of Operations? 
• MOP 4.1.2. What is the probability of kill given a hit? 
• MOE 4.2: Is the UAV Vulnerable  
• MOP 4.2.1 Is the UAV capable of operating with damage? 
• MOP 4.2.2. What is the probability of mission completion given 
damage? 
• MOE 4.3 Is the UAV Susceptible 
• MOP 4.3.1 What is the level of probability of detect of the UAV? 
• MOP 4.3.2. What is the level of probability of tracking the UAV? 
Launch Operation 
• COI 5: Is the UAV rapidly deployable?  
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• MOE 5.1:  Deployment time 
• MOP 5.1.1: Time to setup unmanned vehicle for launch 
• MOE 5.2:  Initialization time  
• COI 6: Is the UAV prepared for launch? 
• MOE 6.1:  Pre-flight  
• MOP 6.1.1: Time to initialize unmanned vehicle for launch 
• MOP 6.1.2: Time to initialize GPS/INS? 
• MOP 6.1.3: Time to synchronize communication with terminal 
platform 
• MOP 6.1.4: Attain minimum engine RPM before launch 
• MOP 6.1.5: Achieve the required deflection on rudder, aileron and flap 
• MOE 6.2: Environmental conditions for launch 
• MOP 6.2.1: Maximum allowable wind speed for launch 
• MOP 6.2.3: Maximum allowable sea state for launch 
• COI 7: Can a sufficient number of UAV be launched as a sortie? 
• MOE 7.1: Successful takeoff 
• MOP 7.1.2: Number of successful takeoffs within specified time frame  
Recovery Operation 
• COI 8: Is the UAV able to execute its recovery (landing) procedures 
upon mission completion? 
• MOE 8.1: Navigate to recovery site 
• MOP 8.1.1: Time to reach to recovery site 
• MOP 8.1.2: Number of recovery waypoint attain  
• COI 9: Can the UAV be recovered with minimum resources? 
• MOE 9.1: Landing space requirement 
• MOP 9.1.1: Minimum landing space on recovery site 
• MOP 9.1.2: Maximum levelness required on recovery site 
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• MOP 9.1.3 Terrain inclination/features 
• MOE 9.2: Manpower requirement 
• MOP 9.2.1: Minimum manpower to recover UAV 
• MOP 9.2.2: Minimum skill level required for recovery operation 
• COI 10: Can the UAV be recovered safely within minimum 
requirements? 
• MOE 10.1: Safety considerations 
• MOP 10.1.1: Minimum safety distance for personnel at recovery site 
• COI 11: Can the UAVs be recovered in a reasonable time period? 
• MOE 11.1:  Successful recovery 
• MOP 11.1.1: Number of successful recovery within specified period. 
• COI 12: Is the system of systems transportable?  
• MOE 12.1: Is the UAV capable of storage on a SAG ship (Packaging 
Requirements) 
• MOP 12.1.1 Size of dismantled UAV 
• DR 12.1.1.1 Determine dimensions (Length x Breadth x Height) of 
each UAV subsystem  
• DR 12.2.1.1 Determine volume of storage compartment for all the 
containers 
• DR 12.2.1.2 Determine the volume of space for storage of test 
equipment 
• MOP 12.1.2 Size of assembled UAV 
• DR 12.1.2.1: Determine overall dimension of UAV 
• MOP 12.1.3: Size of support elements 
• DR 12.1.3.1 Determine dimensions (Length x Breadth x Height) of 
each box 
• DR 12.1.3.2 Total volume of all containers 
• DR 12.1.3.3 Determine dimensions of structure to hold the UAV for 
assembly/dismantling/maintenance 
 155 
• MOP 12.1.4 Weight of dismantled UAV 
• DR 12.1.1.4.1 Determine weight of each UAV subsystem 
• MOP 12.1.5 Weight of assembled UAV 
• DR 12.1.5.1: Determine overall weight of UAV 
• MOP 12.1.6: Size of support elements 
• DR 12.1.6.1 Determine weight of each box 
• DR 12.1.6.2 Total weight of all containers 
• DR 12.1.6.3 Determine weight of structure to hold the UAV for 
assembly/dismantling/maintenance 
• MOP 12.1.7 Sensitive equipment / costly equipment / classified 
equipment 
• DR 12.1.7.1 Sensitive equipment / costly equipment / classified 
equipment 
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